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I. INTRODUCTION: TRANSITIONAL POLITICS
IN INDONESIA
President Suharto’s New Order, long established as a counterregime to the heady days of Sukarnoist realpolitik based on a raison
d’etre of developmentalism and economic progress, suffered a calamitous shock to the very foundation that it was built upon. The
Asian Financial Crisis that swept throughout Southeast Asia in late
1997 took Indonesia and the New Order by storm. In its wake, it
had nullified the astounding economic progress that the New Order
had undertaken and stood for as its vanguard since the collapse of
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, revealing the disrepute within.1 The
accompanying rapid avalanche of events toppled the New Order,
and plunged the Indonesian state into the brink of an existential
1. By the end of January 1998, the decline of the Rupiah reached a psychological
mark of Rp11 050 per US Dollar. Unemployment increased from 4.68 million in 1997 to
5.46 million in 1998 while underemployment ballooned from 28.2 million in 1997 to 32.1
million in 1998.
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crisis that threatened to endanger the country’s very survival. Clarion’s call for reforms (reformasi) especially towards the rooting out
of entrenched KKN practices (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme: Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism) sounded amidst concerns of imminent Balkanization and communal unrest that sought to tear the
nation asunder.2 Being thrust precipitously into the edifice of political volatility, President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie as the immediate successor of Suharto was unceremoniously charged with
charting a new direction despite lacking strong legitimacy within
and outside of the New Order circle. His presidency, though shortlived, was to prove tremendously pivotal setting to the tenor of
what was to become the Reformasi agenda.3
Now almost fifteen years into the era known as Reformasi in
Indonesia, scholars are still wrestling with how to characterize the
new polity. Indonesia had undoubtedly democratized, however, it
was not without its recurring defects. “Hybrid regime,” “Collusive
democracy,” “Patrimonial democracy” and “Patronage democracy”
are some of the terms that have been used to describe the new polity as Indonesia transits from a procedural form of democracy to a
consolidation phase.4 While it is evident that checks and balances
against centralized authoritarianism have been implemented, many
would acquiesce that the scourge of the New Order KKN and other
ills has not entirely been extirpated from the system. Some argued
that hegemonic forces under Suharto survived and merely reorganized themselves in accordance to the new political climate.5 This
2. KKN, an acronym for “Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme: Corruption, Collusion
and Nepotism” was a common refrain underlying the public’s discontent with aspects of
Suharto’s authoritarian regime. By default, KKN became the de facto definition for
good governance during the early years of Reformasi.
3. In his memoir, Habibie noted that the domestic and foreign press expected his
presidency to last only 100 days. See Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, Decisive Moments:
Indonesia’s Long Road to Democracy (Jakarta: Ilthabi Rekatama, 2006).
4. These characterizations of the new Indonesian polity are taken from Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number
2 (April 2002): 21-35; Dan Slater, “Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and
Presidential Power after Democratic Transition,” Indonesia 78 (October 2004):61-92;
Douglas Webber, “A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in PostSuharto Indonesia,” Democratization 13 (June 2006): 396-420; Gerry van Klinken, “Patronage Democracy in Provincial Indonesia,” in Olle Tornquist, Neil Webster and Kristian Stokke, eds., Rethinking Popular Representation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2009). See also Edward Aspinall, “The Irony of Success,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 21, Number 2 (April 2010): 20-34.
5. See Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The
Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) pp. 10-4.
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paved the way for more substantial arguments citing the resilience
of strong oligarchic tendencies within the new Indonesian democracy.6 Nonetheless, it would also be imprecise to say that Indonesia
had not moved beyond the New Order and its ways of conducting
affairs. Beginning with Habibie, institutions like the military and
the regime party Golkar, which formed the bulwark of the New
Order, were incrementally disempowered from their hegemonic position via systematic constitutional reforms. Decentralization
quickly assumed in succession of the “big bang” approach.7 Democratization occurred at a less expeditious pace though it eventually
expanded beyond national levels to include provincial, regional and
district (bupati) levels.8 Reforms made during Habibie’s presidency
were palpably decisive and momentous and set the framework for
what was to come – the periods after had more room for deliberation. These reforms, though predicated largely upon the work of
elites, can be seen to have their first impulses from below with the
masses, as contended by others. Consequently, there were counterarguments implying that reforms were largely the crystallized efforts of a mobilized civil society and powerful movements from below.9 A third position summoned the lenses of pluralism to account
for the discrepancies between conceptual definitions of oligarchy
and the differences in policy outcomes.10 Of all arguments purportedly attempting to characterize the contemporary Indonesian polity, the former (Winters’ oligarchic theory) stood out as the
dominant approach.
Many applauded Indonesia’s foray into democratization but lamented when it fell far short of expectations especially during its
consolidation phase.11 Some suggested that it was from the begin6. See Jeffrey A. Winters, “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia,” Indonesia 96
(October 2013):11-33.
7. The defining aspects of the “Big Bang” approach according to the words of
World Bank economist Anwar Shah is that it is “holistic (comprehensive)” and “implemented at lightning speed.” See Anwar Shah and Theresa Thompson “Implementing
Decentralized Local Governance: A Treacherous Road with Potholes, Detours, and
Road Closures,” in Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed.) Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal
Relations and the Rebuilding of Indonesia (Edward Elgar Press, 2004) pp. 317.
8. Local direct elections were recently rescinded.
9. See Edward Aspinall, “Popular Agency and Interests in Indonesia’s Democratic
Transition and Consolidation,” Indonesia 96 (October 2013): 101-21.
10. See Thomas B. Pepinsky, “Pluralism and Political Conflict in Indonesia,” Indonesia 96 (October 20213): 81-100.
11. Direct elections at the local level were recently scrapped. See Jonathan Chen
and Adhi Priamarizki, “Why abolishing direct local elections undermines Indonesia’s
democracy” in East Asia Forum, 9 October 2014.
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ning an essentially top-down, elite-driven process, thus it was not a
surprise that reforms and democratic deepening efforts remained
stagnant after a period of time.12 Others pointed to the plebeian
nature of the emergence of Reformasi as movements initiated from
the ground, but did not dismiss the variable impact it had later on.13
Both points of views, though valid, are unable to answer the conflicting and sometimes frustratingly paradoxical nature of democratic change in Indonesia.14 This paper seeks to answer such a
question by positing that a wholly deterministic expectation of Indonesia progressing along a standard transitional paradigm towards
full democratization in its teleological sense misses the mark.
Rather, it looks at the inherent motivations and conditions behind
the causes for democratization. One must note that the notion of
tabula rasa, or even a “fresh start” is clearly something of a myth
while democratization alone does not objectively possess a standard. While a minimalist conception of democracy has been
achieved, existing legacies of the New Order that are the characteristic of Indonesia and structuralist’s misdiagnosis have undoubtedly
hindered a further deepening of democratization, resulting in what
is known as a “protracted transition.” This paper also asserts that a
more judicious method in analyzing the state of democratic health
in Indonesia is in a systemic look at what had changed and what
had remained since reforms were instituted.
Phenomenal progress on democratization and decentralization
were made very early on but lost steam as due contingencies and
structures that discouraged and deterred the entrenched practices
of clientelism, brokerage and patronage were not accounted for or
anticipated. In fact, it had proliferated where it once was centralized. This latter development, however, should not be confused
with the genuine efforts at reforms made under the brow of extreme desperation and stress especially during the brief interregnum after the fall of Suharto. The early reformasi presidents’ pathbreaking reforms were forged under parlous conditions in a “crisis12. See for example Dwight Y. King, Half-hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions
and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003)
pp.221-4. King argued that Indonesia’s democratic transition began as “a ‘pact’ from
above and evolved into ‘reform’ involving election-validated representatives of the
masses.
13. See Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime
Change in Indonesia (California: Stanford University Press, 2005).
14. See Richard Robison, “What sort of democracy? Predatory and neo-liberal
agendas” in Indonesia In: Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The construction
of identity (Routledge 2002), pp. 92-113.
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ridden” environment; their primary intent, as one cannot deny, was
for the preservation of the unitary state from forces that threatened
to break it apart. This paper argues that necessity was the primary
catalyst that mandated transitional change in Indonesia but was evidently not enough. No longer inconvenienced by a narrower range
of options as the countless problems that had plagued Indonesia in
1998 were gradually resolved, political firefighting became less onerous while reforms consequently lost their panache. Reforms then
followed a less compelling trajectory –one that was very often beholden or subjected to political expediency and private interests
rather than the collective interests of democratic change. The subsequent democratization consolidation phase was thus alluded to a
“politics-as-usual” mode where politics of the old subsequently
resurfaced.15
We argue that Indonesia’s path to democracy was borne out of
necessity brought about by a state of extreme precariousness and
then molded by its lack thereof. Its lack thereof precisely reflected
the internal power struggle and elite competition between remnant
groups of the New Order vying under a different set of circumstances. Notwithstanding the given peculiarities of Indonesia’s transition, the current state of democracy in Indonesia is clearly one
that is also shaped by the patrimonial character of the New Order.16
While imminent necessity acts as a temporary stop to ensure that
these predatory tendencies of Indonesia’s political system do not
come to the fore, its dissolution subsequently opened up the avenues for them to remerge. For even necessity has its limitations and
these limitations lie in its eventual demise. Such a pattern inevitably
contributed to perceptions of Indonesia’s reform process as being
perceived as a vacillating “two steps forward, one step back.”17 The
study can thus be chronologically divided into two parts. The first
part mainly features the predominantly necessity-based reforms
15. “Politics-as-usual” mode, in contrast to the “crisis-ridden” mode, carries with it
the impending notion of bureaucratic and narrow clientelistic relationships as being
more salient. See Harold Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto (Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2010), pp. 7-14.
16. Chehabi and Linz have indicated that “if the sultanistic regime is replaced by a
democracy, chances are this democracy will display strong clientelist tendencies, with
the democratically elected leaders using the resources of their office to build nationwide patron-client relationships.” See Houchang E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, “A Theory of Sultanism”, in Sultanistic Regimes, Chehabi and Linz eds. (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1998).
17. See Damien Kingsbury, Two steps forward, one step back: Indonesia’s arduous
path of reform in Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), January 2012.
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presented within administrations of the early reform period including the short-lived presidencies of Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid
and Megawati. The second part features the non-necessity-based reforms that constitute the “democratic consolidation” phase of the
Yudhoyono presidency and beyond. This study highlights and evaluates both the specific “steps forward” (necessity present) as well as
the contentious “steps back” (necessity absent) Indonesia has taken
so far in its reformasi journey in an attempt to redefine the new
polity. We conclude that post-reformasi Indonesia has increasingly
tended toward a “decentered democracy.”
II. NECESSITY MAKES STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: THE
GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXT FOR
DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA
By the late 1990s, the world was riding along what was known
as the “third wave of democracy.”18 The domino effect of increased
democratization around the world, beginning with the Carnation
Revolution in Portugal, gathered momentum with its spread to
Latin American and Asian Pacific countries in which more than
thirty countries have since shifted from authoritarian forms of government to a proto-democratized one.19 As global consciousness towards the “snowballing” effect of increased cries for
democratization heightened, it made its presence locally felt. In the
last few years of New Order Indonesia (while it was still considered
dangerous to criticize or question the legitimacy of the authoritarian administration), students and intellectuals were already flirting
with the literature and ideas of a greater openness in politics with
their closest example – Philippines-style “people power” – as their
inspiration.20 Democratization (in the sense of holding free and fair
multiparty elections) as a main bulwark of the country vis-à-vis
developmentalism (pembangunan) gained currency but did not acquire an impulse strong enough to bring it to fruition.21 That was
changed by the rapid-fire collapse of the Indonesian economy fol18. See Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave”, Journal of Democracy,
Volume 2, Number 2 (Spring 1991): 12-34.
19. In Asia, authoritarian regimes were replaced with democracies in the Philippines in 1986, in South Korea in 1987 and in Thailand in 1982. Indonesia, on the other
hand, was a latecomer.
20. See Edward Aspinall, ibid. pp. 118-27.
21. Periodic elections were held under the Suharto regime although it as engineered
under strict control such that the ruling hegemonic party vehicle always emerged a significant majority winner.
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lowing the onslaught of the Asian Financial Crisis. Following a
whirlwind of events, President Suharto was forced to resign by May
1998. In his place, Vice-President Habibie was quickly sworn in to
the presidency but it was already predicted that his tenure would be
short.22
Immediately after Habibie’s swearing-in ceremony, he was besieged by the contentious task of quickly assembling a suitable cabinet in a politically fragile environment. In a matter of days, the
Development Reform Cabinet (Kabinet Reformasi Pembangunan)
was formed.23 Not entirely reformist in nature, its most immediate
concern was to accommodate both national and international demands for political reforms. Whereas in the past the Suharto New
Order’s legitimacy was primarily based upon the promise of economic developmentalism, the dismal shape of the Indonesian economy then implied that an alternative legitimation had to be
sought.24 In its place came imminent plans to democratize and decentralize.25 Even though Habibie himself never showed any strong
democratic leanings during his long tenure under the Suharto government, he opted to move in the direction of democratization,
which was now seen as a panacea to the political instability, in the
midst of unpromising circumstances and a huge legitimacy problem.26 Scholars dubbed this brief period of crucial reforms – that
covered both the short-lived presidencies of Abdurrahman Wahid
and Megawati Sukarnoputri – as a “crisis-ridden” reform phase,
22. Habibie himself noted that reports in the domestic and foreign press expected
that his presidency to last only 100 hours. The slightly more optimistic ones nonetheless
predicted that he will not last for more than 100 days. See Habibie ibid. pp. 77.
23. See Habibie, ibid. pp. 81-4.
24. Ironically the New Order regime had sacrificed development at the regions as a
result of its centralization approach.
25. Early in his Cabinet meetings in mid-1998, President Habibie already had in
place a Reform Working Group. A few immediate reform initiatives then pioneered
was the preparation of a national reform agenda and limiting the presidential term of
office. Habibie’s democratization programme was then formalized at a Special Session
of the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) in November 1998 that brought elections
forward to June 1999. Major reforms during Habibie’s tenure include the releasing of
political prisoners, the reform of the anti-subversion law, the lifting of restrictions on
the press, the formation of new political parties and the holding of new general elections. See Habibie, ibid. pp. 115-23. See also Crouch ibid. pp. 25-7.
26. Incidentally as Indonesia emerges as a democracy in late 1998-1999, it marked
the beginning of a significant recession in democracy. See Larry Diamond, “Indonesia’s
Place in Global Democracy” in Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections,
Institutions and Society, Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, eds. (Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2010), pp. 21-7.
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drawing attention to the particularly parlous conditions present
within Indonesia.27
To better analyse the tumultuous state of affairs during Indonesia’s transitional period and how Indonesia achieved its goals of
democratic transition quite rapidly in the first few years of
reformasi yet fell behind precipitously, we turn to the idea and nature of necessity (or necessità). Made famous by the works of Italian
philosopher and strategist Niccolò Machiavelli, the question of necessity usually carries implications of imminence that often slips
into some form of moral ambivalence. With the preservation and
longevity of the state possessing an overriding importance as the
ultimate end, necessity becomes a substitute for what is seen to be
good or virtuous – including being invariably tied to the use of violence if necessary. While most discussions had centered upon necessity as a primary facet of security in the invocation of wars and
harsh measures, it may not always be the case. For the case of Indonesia’s political transition, the absorptive capacity of timely democratization did not necessitate the aberrant use of violence as a
means to achieve state unitary. It did, however, imply that one form
of legitimation (economic developmentalism) had to be traded for
another (democratization). On the other hand, while democratization and devolution of powers certainly did not appeal as much to
the New Order figures who used the ways of centralized, authoritarian rule, the necessity imposed by the extremely fractious situation
ironically allowed for an opening for reforms that did just that.
This concept of necessity, in line with an inference of what
Machiavelli had written, is grounded in an understanding of human
nature that can be extended to the state. Machiavelli contends that
men and by extension states are acquisitive and ambitious.28 This
works well for a free state whose ends are undoubtedly for acquisition and self-preservation. However, it is in the advent of a crisis
that necessity ultimately jolts the state into the arms of a common,
collective good.29 In his letters, he mentioned that “men are led by
27. See Crouch ibid. pp. 15, 21-8.
28. Notwithstanding his views on the more macabre nature of men – in The Prince
Machiavelli mentioned that men in general have a “natural and ordinary” desire to
acquire. He adds in The Discourses to Livy that they are “so unquiet that however little
the door to ambition is opened for them, they at once forget every love”. See Niccolò
Machiavelli, The Prince (III) pp. 14 and The Discourses to Livy (III.2).
29. Machiavelli mentions “that men never do good unless necessity drives them to
it; but when they are too free to choose and can do just as they please, confusion and
disorder become everywhere rampant.” See Discourses I.3. See also Discourses III.12
where Machiavelli contends “. . . how useful a part necessity plays in human affairs, and
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necessity to do what it was not their intention to do.”30 Mansfield
probably provides a more succinct juxtaposition of what necessity
encompasses from his readings of Machiavelli. He notes that “necessity. . . refers to what is humanly necessary, as opposed to what is
necessary for the fulfilment of human nature.”31 In other words,
necessity can be seen as a drive or compulsion (or even coercion)
that makes states act regardless of, or despite of, its inclination. It
may not be the result derived from a severe imposition, but in the
case of Indonesia in 1998, where state legitimacy was seriously challenged, it certainly is.
With the concept of necessity as a backdrop, Machiavelli goes
on to add that when the necessity that restrains men and states to
virtuous action for the benefit of the common good comes not from
rulers and princes but from external circumstances, it is known for
all intents and purposes as an act of fortune (Fortuna) – or unpredictability. As such, subjected to the vagaries of Fortuna, if necessity ever changes, Machiavelli demonstrates that it may not be
necessarily controllable by princes or statesmen. He then makes the
argument that while fortune/unpredictability can be restrained with
prudence, it is a rare gift. Rather, both man and state alike benefit
from the greatest extent unintentional necessity brings to them. He
argues that “to many things that reason does not bring you, necessity brings you.”32
to what glorious deeds it may lead men. As some moral philosophers in their writings
have remarked, neither of the two most noble instruments to which man’s nobility is
due, his hands and his tongue, would have attained such perfection in their work or
have carried men’s works to the height which one can see they have reached, if they
have not been driven to it by necessity.” In classical thought, necessity is also reflected
as the drive behind virtue including Ovid’s ingenium mala saepe movent (difficulty is
what wakes up the genius) and a Latin saying that sophistication is born out of hunger/
necessity (artificia docuit fames).
30. See Niccolò Machiavelli letter to Francesco Vettori of 10 December 1513. Note
also Machiavelli’s comments - “It should be stressed that the necessity being imposed
upon the individual is an important sense more formal than specific: an obligation to
respect some system of law and property rather than the specific system now obtaining”
cited in J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975) p. 376.
31. Mansfield drew his conclusion largely from Machiavelli’s discussion of the creation and foundation of cities which he sets down in the Discourses. Machiavelli observes
that the virtue of the founder of the cities can be recognized both in the choice of site
and the ordering of the laws. He also added that “men work either by necessity or by
choice. . . there is greater virtue to be seen where choice has less authority.” See Harvey
C. Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) pp. 55.
32. See Discourses I.6. To add, Machiavelli envisioned the dawn of necessity to be
part of a cyclic process. He mentioned “usually provinces go most of the time, in the
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Similarly, the early turbulent years of the post-Suharto era necessitated changes that ran counter to the interests of elites and oligarchs – only later to be counteracted by a reassertion of their
influence. The dramatic change compelled those with established
powers to re-adjust themselves in an environment with almost completely different rules. As argued, democratization would deprive
the former hegemonic regime-backed party Golkar of its guaranteed victories in elections while decentralization would imply transference of resources away from the central elites. A restriction on
direct political involvement of the Indonesian military would essentially deny the kickbacks it derived from its territorial network. Necessity thus plays an immensely direct role in setting the seemingly
immutable democratization and decentralization process in motion
in Indonesia – the distinct attributes and features that make up the
Suharto New Order were consequently abandoned or nullified.
Reformasi Indonesia had indeed dealt a stake unto what was left of
the New Order. The point where necessity loses its very brief hold
after its initiation to democratic reforms is the point where both
oligarchic and elite predatory forces come to the fore. This has been
categorically defined as a “politics-as-usual” atmosphere within
reformasi Indonesia and is seen to have emerged after the erratic
and often informal rule of Abdurrahman Wahid, a man widely seen
as a democrat.33 To be more precise, although it was widely seen
that it was only until the Yudhoyono administration that the “transitional period” in Indonesia was brought to an end, it was also the
period seen as the beginnings of the encroachment of oligarchic and
other predatory influence upon the newly instituted political system.34 The Yudhoyono period is nonetheless noted for its stabilizing effect upon Indonesian politics whereby for the first time direct
changes they make, from order to disorder and then pass again from disorder to order,
for worldly things are not allowed by nature to stand still. As soon as they reach their
ultimate perfection, having no further to rise, they must descend; and similarly, once
they have descended and through their disorders arrived at the ultimate depth, since
they cannot descend further, of necessity they must rise. Thus they are always descending from good to bad and rising from bad to good. For virtue gives birth to quiet, quiet
to leisure, leisure to disorder, disorder to ruin; and similarly, from ruin, order is born;
from order, virtue; and from virtue, glory and good fortune.” See Machiavelli in Florentine Histories, Book V.
33. See Crouch ibid. pp. 28-32.
34. Ironically it was only until after 2006 (two years into the administration of the
first Yudhoyono Presidency) that Freedom House ratings for Indonesia were adjusted
throughout all categories to result in a status that was “Free” (from “Partly Free”). It
stayed within the same “Free” status for another 8 years. Indonesia then reverted to a
status of “Partly Free” only recently in 2014.
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presidential elections were held. It was also accompanied by a decade-long hold onto power by Yudhoyono, the longest serving president in reformasi Indonesia by far. However, while oligarchic forces
resumed their intransigent hold on Indonesia’s democratic institutions and procedures, it was challenged equally by an opposing nonoligarchic force that can be said to be made up of primarily grassroots volunteerism.
The concept of necessity thus serves as a particular prism in
which to examine the intentions and conditions that result in a democratic change often perceived as spectacular within Indonesia in an
era where democratization was starting to ebb. Necessity did indeed
dislodge the distinguishable features of New Order Indonesia.
However, it had failed to curtail and probably would not have
halted the pace of a resumption of “old” oligarchic and patronage
interests seen collectively during the pre-reformasi era as KKN.
Necessary change is often inherently irrevocable as it represents the
constituent building blocks of the new regime or era – that is, unless
further compulsion brought about by a crisis situation induces it to
change. On the other hand, once devoid of necessity the change
that is brought about is often retractable and is less of a permanent
fixture in the political landscape. Correspondingly, when examined
in context of the emerging problems that democratization brings
along following the imminent demise of necessity, a more nuanced
and realistic outlook of the nature of Indonesia’s democracy and its
future can then be assessed.
III. NECESSITY-BASED REFORMS
A. What Necessity Inevitably Entailed: Changes to Defining
Features of the New Order
The dawn of reformasi in Indonesia essentially involved the unravelling of prominent structural features that were idiosyncratic of
the Suharto regime – that is, authoritarian and centralized. These
two variables intertwined as the regime that prioritized economic
development above all and this placed a high premium upon political stability. Invariably a product of Revolutionary and “Old Order” Indonesia, due to his experiences both in the battlefield and as
a keen observer of politics, Suharto was very much in opposition to
the fissiparousness of both civilian politicians and the Indonesian
people.35 Elson, in a succinct summary of Suharto, mentions a curi35. See R.E. Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography (Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge 2001), pp. 42-4.
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ously interesting depiction of Suharto’s highly conservative understanding and view of Indonesian history including the fact that
Suharto “did not trust those (the) people” and viewed them “like
children” in which they “became an objectified category upon
which Suharto had to work to give them what they really needed in
the interests of the total society.”36 On the other hand, the Army
was considered in light of its “special status and duty in the affairs
of the independent Republic,” which meant it had to adopt a “paternalistic role in uplifting the people’s material and spiritual fortunes.” The army’s self-proclaimed contribution to the country’s
independence became the justifying clause for various privileges acceded to them. Due to the unique considerations of Indonesia at
that time, Suharto sought to reshape the two components of the
Indonesian political system – namely the armed forces and the electoral system – while instituting a wholly alien institution and electoral vehicle – that of Golkar (or “functional groups”).37 Thus
emerged what was the defining features of a centralized and authoritarian rule under Suharto amongst surrounding political contours
that included the dwifungsi (“dual function”) role of the armed
forces, the hegemonic dominance of Golkar as a strategic electoral
vehicle and the devolution of the national and regional offices. The
new reformasi era, however, had to replace these defining features
of the New Order with those of their own.
1. Military Reform: From Dual Function (Dwifungsi) to
Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)38
The new reformasi government had to first rid itself of the direct influence of the military (then known as ABRI: Angkata Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) in the role of politics that had been
deemed too pernicious and untenable by the Indonesian public
since the fall of Suharto. First conceived during Suharto’s First Development Cabinet to drive development and security, the military
aspired to a dualistic role in Indonesian society known as dwifungsi
(dual function). According to the dwifungsi concept, the military
acts as a force in the fields of defence and security (Hankam,
Pertahanan Keamanan) as well as that of a socio-political guarantor
(Sospol, Sosial Politik) in government and society. This entails that
the military plays a direct hand in government matters, which to36. See Elson ibid. pp. 303.
37. See Elson ibid. pp. 180-90.
38. NKRI or Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia refers to the Unitary State of the
Republic of Indonesia.

14

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

wards the end of Suharto’s rule, became increasingly violent and
manipulative.39
With the sudden fall of Suharto as a patron, public antagonism
and recrimination were directed at the military institution. The military involvement in cases of human rights abuses including the abduction of student activists, the Trisakti shootings and the May riots
forced the already demoralized military into the corner. With the
fears of being split by factional infighting within and demoralized
by an increasingly hostile public, even with Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto by then out of the picture, it became necessary to institute
both house-cleaning (de-Prabowo-isasi or “de-Prabowo-ization”)
and reform initiatives in order to distance the military from its New
Order Package (Paket Orde Baru) links.40 In September 1998, then
Commander-in-Chief, General Wiranto, and a few of his advisors
engineered a reform framework for the military in a seminar held in
Bandung in what was to become the “New Paradigm” (Paradigma
Baru) doctrine under the auspices of the Habibie government.41 It
was the first reform initiative by the military. Again, General
Wiranto was hardly a reformer but had been nonetheless necessitated by particular circumstances to attempt limited reforms, although a great many officers and men seemed inclined to the status
quo. He understood that what was crucial and necessary at that time
was for the military to create a new public image and credibility by
shedding the military’s label of alat mati pemerintah or “the government’s killing tool.”42 He also understood and felt first-hand of the
dwifungsi-democratization dilemma that would inevitably accom39. Such a role that the military takes on inevitably grew out of its experiences
during the revolutionary period with the military seen as representing the interest of the
people and a unique “people’s army” that was duty-bound to participate in the affairs
of the state. See Leonard C. Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military
Force (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006) pp. 323.
40. See Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia (New York:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) pp. 164.
41. The rivalry within the Indonesian military at that time was essentially a struggle
over patronage networks in the “red-and-white” camp led by Gen. Wiranto and the
“green” Islamic officers led by then Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto – a product of
Suharto’s divide-and-rule strategy. The Prabowo circle was then subsequently removed.
The leading advisors that promulgated reforms within the military were primarily from
Gen. Wiranto’s “red-and-white” camp including ABRI Chief of Staff for Social and
Political Affairs, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and two other members of the
general ABRI staff, Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo and Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah.
See Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia (Singapore:
ISEAS, 2009) pp. 135
42. See Jun Honna ibid, pp. 168-9.
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pany it. Of course, Wiranto also sought to distance himself from the
abuses of power while rebranding as a born-again reformer, a calculated position, nonetheless, to assume consolidation of position and
influence within the military. The “New Paradigm” asserted that
the military would no longer seek to “occupy” positions in the government but play a role only in “influencing” government decisions,
exercising its influence “indirectly.”43 It would also “share” power
with the civilian political forces instead of dominating the government. Comprised of the “14 Strategic Action Plans,” the military
embarked on a period of ambitious reforms that steadily allowed
for the detachment from the reins of centralized representation and
authority. Beginning with the gradual liquidation of the military’s
Central Council of Socio-political Affairs (Wansospolsus) and Regional Council of Socio-political Affairs (Wansospolda), it was accompanied by the withdrawal of seconded military officers holding
positions in government and bureaucracy, also known as kekaryaan.
In early 1999, reforms cascaded down to the gradual removal of
military representatives in the national and regional legislatures.44
This was followed by the process of splitting the police force from
the military on April 1, 1999 and the highly symbolic move of
changing its name from ABRI to TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia,
Indonesian National Military) to distance itself from the New Order. However, all this did not come close to the blow that the military would suffer as seen from its political inability to block
President Habibie’s decision in holding a referendum on deciding
the fate of East Timor. President Habibie’s links with the more militant elements of ICMI (Ikatan Candekiawan Muslim Indonesia or
the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) also proved to
be a tenuous factor between both institutions as they compete for
43. Four Key aspects of the New Paradigm are 1. ABRI’s disengagement from the
‘the forefront of politics’; 2. Shifting ABRI’s role from that of ‘controlling’ politics to
‘influencing’ politics; 3. Shifting ABRI’s political commitment from the forefront of
things, from a ‘direct’ role to an ‘indirect’ role; and 4. Sharing power with civilians. See
Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI Headquarters], TNI Abad XXI.
Redefinisi. Reposisi, dan Reaktualisasi Peran TNI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa [TNI 21st
Century, Redefinition, Reposition, and Reactualisation of TNI’s Role in Duties] 4th
edition (Jakarta: CV Jasa Bumi, June 1999) and A. Malik Haramain, “Gus Dur dan
Reposisi Militer [Gus Dur and Military Reposition]” in Khamami Zada (ed.) Neraca
Gus Dur di Panggung Kekuasaan [Gus Dur’s Scales in Power Stage],” (Jakarta: Lakspedam, August 2002), pp. 69 -118.
44. Such reforms evidently received substantial resistance from different quarters
that involved compromises. Eventually, the military accepted electoral laws that reduced its representation in the DPR by half and in the regional legislatures by 10
percent.
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influence in the new reformasi political theatre. More credit, however, should be given to the “reform-minded” faction in the military
for pushing through reform initiatives despite the apparent impasse
within Wiranto’s own political ambitions of consolidating power for
himself and those within his circle.45
Under President Abdurrahman Wahid (or Gus Dur), however,
reforms proceeded apace, but were stymied momentarily by unsuitable appointments to the role of Commander-in-Chief, with statusquo officers rising to the fore. Initially, the military expected that
Wahid would be sympathetic to the military and agree with its plans
to conduct internal reform gradually. Gus Dur acted in contrast to
the military’s expectation by intervening in the process with the
hope of expediting the reform process.46 Wary of Wiranto’s influence within the military, Gus Dur sacked him from the powerful
post of Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs
(Menko Polkam) following allegations human rights abuses in East
Timor. Wiranto was replaced by Juwono Sudarsono as the first civilian to head the Defence Ministry.47 Gus Dur then sought to promote officers loyal to him which led to further intra-military rivalry.
However, this resulted in each faction (now the TyasnoWirahadikusumah group and the Admiral Widodo circle) competing as representatives of democratization reforms to bolster their
legitimacy. Gus Dur embroilment with impeachment matters eventually shelved all reform initiatives by the latter part of 2000. It
must be said that the early term of Gus Dur set a high expectation
on the prospect of military reform, in which he constantly hinted on
the notion of civilian supremacy. He indicated this assertion
through his approaches on domestic conflicts, such as his efforts to
impose a ceasefire with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and his
45. General Wiranto became more active in political affairs after distancing himself
from the Habibie-ICMI circle. With competitors general allied with Prabowo and ICMI
out of the picture, he started promoting officers who shared the same background with
him much to the chagrin of reform-minded officers who felt that such a move will jeopardize reform initiatives.
46. These processes include expediting the preparation period for the police’s separation from the military that is considered too lengthy, implicit attempts at reforming
the Territorial Command Structure, the tacit reduction of military representation in
Parliament and attempting to commit to a second version of New Paradigm reforms
including the addition of reform programmes. See Sukardi Rinakit, The Indonesian Military after the New Order (Copenhagen: NIAS press, 2005), pp. 134 - 141.
47. See the International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 20 September 2000.
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personal approaches to separatist movements in Papua.48 However,
political expediency and elite competition eventually caught on and
the momentum for reforms eventually dissipated.
Besides the efforts arising from the civilian sector, the TNI initiated internal reforms by publishing a document entitled The Role
of the TNI in the twenty-first Century in 2001. The document clearly
stated the TNI’s commitment to forgo its socio-political role and
reassert its pledge in preserving national defence by developing a
joint warfare doctrine, increasing its organizational effectiveness
and transferring its responsibility for domestic security to the
POLRI (Indonesian national police, Kepolisian Negara Republik
Indonesia).49 The military also made crucial steps including the revocation of its socio-political role while inserting the study to humanitarian law within the military curriculum, transferring duties of the
military tribunal from the TNI Headquarters to the Supreme Court
as well as establishing stringent requirements for active officers to
retire from operational duty before joining the elections as a political candidate.50 In addition, the TNI revised its principal and services doctrine gradually in order to strengthen its national defence
capabilities while abandoning its internal security functions.51
Gus Dur’s replacement, President Megawati Sukarnoputri, was
the least reformist amongst the presidents as she paid even less attention to military reform. She appointed a few of her confidantes
to top positions in the TNI, such as General Ryamizard Ryacudu,
Vice Marshall Chappy Hakim, General Endriartono Sutarto and
Vice Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, who were resistant to the notion of a rapid-paced reform. They in turn reinstituted massive restructuring within the military that sought to roll process the reform
process.52 Hailing from the conservative camp, the generals under
Megawati were known for their strong nationalistic stance and a
general close-mindedness towards reforms. Momentum for reform
had been steadily lost; however, the locus of the military having a
direct hand in politics or dwifungsi have been shifted to that of the
maintenance of national unity or NKRI. Further reforms have been
tinged with political calculations of various sorts, although the
48. See Crouch ibid, pp. 137.
49. See Leonard C. Sebastian and Iis Gindarsah,”Taking Stock of Military Reform,” in Jurgen Ruland, Maria-Gabriela Manea and Hans Born (eds.) The Politics of
Military Reform: Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria, (Berlin: Springer, 2013) p. 34
50. See ibid
51. See ibid
52. See Rinakit ibid, pp. 214-215
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emasculation of the intervention of the military in parliamentary
matters by then had plateaued.
Megawati’s ideological disposition became an overweening influence in the rollback on reforms following a tacit return to instituting military autonomy during her presidency. Megawati’s
conservative view on territorial integrity, human rights and individual freedoms contributed substantially to her alliance with non-reformist military officers.53 The parliament’s impeachment of Gus
Dur on the other hand also reduced her trust over civilian politicians in supporting her administration.
The entrenchment of a more conservative paradigm at the
helm of the TNI was not the only factor influencing the sluggish
pace of military reform. The implementation of martial law in Aceh
and the rising global terrorist threat also contributed to the slowdown in reforms. Many of Jakarta-based politicians were impatient
with continued communal conflicts in Eastern Indonesia and the
potential influence of separatist movements in the provinces of
Aceh and Papua. Many believed that the Habibie and Gus Dur Administration’s soft approach was a massive tactical blunder as it did
not produce positive outcomes. A reversion to a tougher hard-line
stance with the involvement of the military was thus seen as the
best way to end the quandary.54 This avenue of greater military involvement and facility also gave the TNI a window of opportunity
to restore its domestic security role in conjunction with the rise of
international terrorism. TNI opportunistically dismissed attempts at
reforming its territorial command structure citing its inherent intelligence potential and capabilities of aiding counter-terrorism
efforts.
Instead of dwifungsi, the almost flagrant use of the term
“NKRI” (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia: Unitary State of
the Republic of Indonesia) to justify the imminent presence of the
TNI reenergized its role within the domestic security realm. Linking
the idea of “kemanunggalan TNI dengan rakyat” (unification between TNI and society) as a means of countering terrorism, the
then Army Chief-of-Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu, allegedly
rejected the more reformist concept of civil-military relations. He
concluded that a “return to barracks” ideology was unsubstantiated
as the TNI would have to assume a new role in maintaining the
integrity of the nation in the face of threats within. This was accom53. See Marcus Mietzner ibid, pp. 226
54. See ibid pp. 227
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panied with renewed fears of the West in fostering the disintegration of the unitary state of Indonesia. Above all, the military was
suspicious of the growing influx of Western Liberal ideas such as
democracy and human rights that would likely compromise the integrity of the state.55 Despite overall sluggishness underlining the
military reform progress, Megawati’s Administration nonetheless
managed to pass a significant Law on the TNI that was very promising in terms of reform.56 However, the law left the territorial command issue untouched.57
The waning progressive movement within the TNI was thus effectively dampened as key proponents of military reform such as
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Agus Widjojo, Agus
Wirahadikusumah and Saurip Kadi were no longer active in the
military.58 In her term, Megawati marginalized Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono as his growing popularity made him a threat to her
presidential ambitions of re-election. Although Yudhoyono later
went on to win the 2004 elections, the intense rivalry between
Megawati and SBY did not end. The anti-reform military officers
managed to side-line Agus Widjojo as his idea of reforming the territorial command structure had drawn large criticisms from his
more conservative colleagues. Widjojo’s removal eventually
thwarted all attempts at revamping the controversial territorial
command structure.59
The rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as the fourth
post-reform president put a momentary stop to the roadblocks that
had been preventing a full-scale reform of the military. Yudhoyono
was seen as a reformist officer able to bridge the gap between con55. See Harold Crouch ibid, pp. 142
56. According to the Law on TNI, the Ministry of Defence will be in charge of
formulating defence policies and strategy and coordinating with the TNI under its authority. The President of the Republic of Indonesia nonetheless has the right to the use
military power (article 3). This law also asserted the Indonesia military’s focus on national defence and a requirement to provide support to the POLRI (Indonesian police
force) for internal security (article 7.2). It states that the TNI’s posture will be structured upon the state’s defence posture in overcoming military and armed threats (article 11.1). The law also mentioned that active military officers cannot hold positions in
political parties, join politics, do business and also become members of parliament or
other political positions (article 39.1). The Law on TNI limited the Indonesian military’s
use of the state budget as its only source of funding (article 66.1).
57. See Harold Crouch ibid, pp. 160 and Law no. 34, year 2004 on TNI.
58. See Damien Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp.186.
59. See Marcus Mietzner ibid, pp. 232.
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servative military doctrines and a civil supremacy.60 To be fair,
Yudhoyono managed both well. His biggest contribution was in the
balance between protecting the core military institution while
preventing its encroachment within the society.61 He also established strong civilian control over the military that essentially ended
the tumultuous democratic transition period.62 Other achievements
include improving welfarism in terms of salaries and benefits within
the military, procuring marquee military platforms and diminishing
factionalism among high ranking officers.63
The strong civilian control over the armed forces had since resulted in a more transparent TNI when compared with Megawati’s
Administration – one that was shrouded in secrecy.64 Yudhoyono
also succeeded in establishing a strong foothold within the TNI by
installing loyalists in the top TNI positions including General Agustadi Sasongko as Army Chief-of-Staff as well as Brother-in-laws Erwin Sudjono as Kostrad Commander and Pramono Edhie Wibowo
as Special Force (Kopassus) Commander.65
Various initiatives in intensifying institutional reforms to the
military were rather ineffective, especially on the issue of self-financing by members of the TNI. Although the TNI agreed to divest
all their business units to the government, its implementation was
far from perfect. TNI, however, also excluded a total of 219 core
businesses from being divested, arguing that these units were essential for the soldiers’ welfare and economic concerns.66
While there are indications that military reform initiatives revived under Yudhoyono, its pace was rather slow as well. This sluggish pace was primarily due to the large body of vested interests
within the military that still sides with the status quo and are resis60. See Yuddy Chrisnandi, “Post-Suharto Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia” in
RSIS Monograph No. 10 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
2007), pp. 53.
61. See Marcus Mietzner, “The Political Marginalization of the Military in Indonesia,” in Marcus Mitzner (ed.), The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia,
(New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2011) pp. 131-138.
62. See Marcus Mietzner, “Praetorian Rule and Redemocratisation in South-East
Asia and the Pacific Island: The Case of Indonesia”, Australian Journal of Political
Affairs, Vo. 67 No. 3, (2013) pp. 306.
63. See Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State, (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2012) pp. 205.
64. See ibid.
65. See Harold Crouch ibid, pp. 152
66. See Marcus Mietzner ibid, pp. 49.
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tant to greater reforms.67 The Yudhoyono Administration nonetheless was the chief architect of two major milestones of military
reform involving the implementation of enactments towards civilian
control while severing the TNI’s dependence on off-budget financing as well as instituting more professionalism by exposing officers
to joint-training or enhancement programmes.68 The relatively successful reform progress failed to progress deeper and was in fact
stymied as the Yudhoyono Administration eventually shifted its focus from military reform into defence transformation following the
introduction of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF).69
Although several grey areas of reform were still left unresolved
(including the demarcation between “defence” and “internal security,” the army’s territorial structure, military finance and latent
human rights allegations), the accumulated “civilianization” meant
that dwifungsi had lost its punch and legitimacy. The likelihood of
the military ever regaining control of the government became small.
Further limitations on the military such as its withdrawal from the
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan
Rakyat) and their insistence on maintaining institutional political
neutrality kept the TNI at bay from formal politics.70
2. Taming Golkar: From Hegemony to Political Party
The emergence of the “Functional Groups” (Golangan Karya
or Golkar) was essentially borne out of Suharto’s general loathing
of the squabbles and partisanship between political parties.71
67. See Damien Kingsbury, “Indonesia in 2006: Cautious Reform,” in Asian Survey
Vol. 47, No. 1 (2007), pp. 155.
68. See John B. Haseman, “Indonesian Military Reform: More than a Human
Rights Issue,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, eds. Daljit Singh and Lorraine Carlos
Salazar (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 113-122.
69. The Minimum Essential Force (MEF) is a concept that systematically outlined –
for the first time in a long while – Indonesia’s strategic requirements until 2024 based
on projected actual threats (terrorism, separatism, border disputes, natural disaster,
horizontal conflicts, energy scarcity) and potential threats (climate change, sea lanes of
communications violations, environmental degradation, pandemics, financial crisis,
cyber crime, foreign aggression, and water and food crisis). See Evan Laksmana, “From
‘Military Reform’ to ‘Defense Transformation’” in The Jakarta Post, 15 September,
2014,
70. See Crouch ibid, pp. 149-150.
71. Golkar was not seen as a real political party but an assemblage of various
groups. Its origins were from an obscure organization created by the Indonesian military called “Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups” (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan
Karya, Sekbar Golkar) founded to counterbalance the increasing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
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Golkar became a unique electoral vehicle that encapsulated
Suharto’s own worldviews. It served three primary functions: a nonideological, pragmatic and programmatic regime vehicle; a patronage-dispensing apparatus and a platform that had access to the
high levers of political power.72 Ever since the first elections were
held in New Order Indonesia in 1971, Golkar became the undisputed electoral machine and hegemonic instrument of the regime.73
Conditions then were skewed very much in Golkar’s favour. Based
on the assumption that Indonesian voters are seen as a floating
mass, the population was largely depoliticized while only Golkar
was allowed to establish branches within sub-districts and villages.
Necessity, especially after the fall of Suharto, however, implied that
the basis for Golkar to function as a hegemonic entity had lost its
legitimacy, notably after the introduction of multiparty elections.
Golkar necessitated a transition from its former hegemonic role to
that of a political party. Such a move, however, did not completely
dislodge Golkar from its axis of influence and party due to its prevalent institutional advantage and territorial reach although several
aspects of the former hegemonic vehicle had been steadily diluted.
In conjunction to the structural changes within the military in
the aftermath of May 1998, Golkar followed suit. The military and
especially the army as well as the Indonesian civil servant corps
(Korps Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia, KORPRI) had been
the main pillars of Golkar’s electoral hegemony during the New Order – their relationship had always been rather symbiotic. Initially
Golkar still conveyed its influence amongst the “floating mass”
(massa mengambang) due very much to its amorphous transformation.74 Even after reforms were instituted during the transitional
phase, Golkar was still seen as a viable platform that officers in the
72. See Elson ibid, pp. 186-8.
73. Golkar had remained dominant throughout the electoral process in the New
Order. From 1971-1997, its results had never dipped below 60 percent. (Parliamentary
votes for Golkar then were 62.8% (1971), 62.1% (1977), 64.2% (1982), 73.2% (1987),
68.1% (1992) and 74.5% (1997). See Jürgen Rüland, “Indonesia” in Elections in Asia
and the Pacific: A Data Handbook, Volume II (D. Nohlen, F. Grotz and C. Hartman
eds.)
74. The “floating mass” refers to a section of the Indonesian people who are not
particularly involved in political activities. The New Order Regime restricted political
activities only to regencies at the kabupaten level. Such a measure provided great opportunities for Golkar to influence the so-called “floating mass” notwithstanding the
fact that many are also civil servants of the state. See Harold Crouch, “The New Order:
The Prospect for Political Stability in Indonesia,” in J.J. Fox (ed.), Indonesia: Australian
Perspectives (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, 1980) pp. 659.
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territorial structure could utilize for later appointments to civilian
positions.75 Nonetheless, by July 1998, Golkar declared itself independent and separate from the military when delegates at the extraordinary national party congress approved reformulation of
Chapter III of the party constitution. This was followed by the replacement of a new reformist-sounding credo “Golkar is independent, open and oriented towards functional work and achievement”
(DPP Partai Golkar) over the old New Order version of “Golongan
Karya is an organization of socio-political power oriented towards
functional work and achievement (karya and kekaryaan)” (DPP
Golongan Karya) – essentially severing its former ties with the military.76 With these new arrangements in place, decisional autonomy
was transferred to the civilian politicians with the abolishment of
the Supervisory Council – to be replaced by the new Advisory
Council. The Advisory Council plays an overseeing role and has
veto powers to annul decisions made by the national leadership
meeting (rapat pimpinan nasional or rapim). These changes within
Golkar were in tandem with reforms within the military. However,
until 2004, the military and particularly certain military elites did
not completely absolve themselves from their ties to the now
Golkar Party.
The 1999 elections were to be a crucial test of the independence of Golkar. Golkar’s severance with the military, however,
had not been clear-cut and its role as a neutral political party have
received mixed reviews. General Wiranto was eyeing for the post of
vice-presidency at that time and in order to placate the military,
then-president and Golkar-nominee Habibie had hinted of his approval. According to Rinakit, just three days before the election,
the military leadership gathered all local commanders in the army
headquarters and exhorted them to “support the fortunes of
Golkar” so as to improve Wiranto’s chances of becoming vice-president.77 A rival of Wiranto, General Wirahadikusumah lamented
that the military was still “far from neutral.” However, others have
observed a noticeable distance between Golkar and the military.78
75. See Harold Crouch, “Wiranto and Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations since
May 1998” in Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, Arief Budiman, Barbara
Hatley and Damien Kingsbury eds. (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute 1999) pp. 143.
76. See Dirk Tomsa, Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the
post-Suharto era (New York: Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series: 2008),
pp. 73-4.
77. See Rinakit ibid, pp. 162.
78. These include Mietzner who thought that the “TNI had remained neutral both
in rhetoric and in practice”; Van Klinken who felt that the 1999 election was “the first
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The reign of Gus Dur demonstrated more clearly the formal
divide between the military and Golkar. It was seen evidently from
the fall-out emanating from the MPR session when General
Wiranto went to great lengths seeking to outdo then party chairman
Akbar Tandjung in order to seal his vice-presidency under the
Wahid administration. Towards the end of the Wahid presidency
both Golkar and the military faction seemingly worked in concert
to impeach Gus Dur, nonetheless neither really had the interest of
the other in mind. This pattern would continue during the
Megawati administration whereby both Golkar and the military
would support the same policies. However, no evidence can be
found that decision-making within Golkar was directly influenced
by the military. It perhaps became even clearer during the 2004
elections that the once over-lapping patronage networks between
the party and the military had linked both organizations had been
essentially severed.79
Under Suharto’s reign, Golkar enjoyed the privileges derived
from the authoritarian government in garnering votes without much
effort based on its strong affiliation with the Indonesian military
and the pegawai negeri sipil or civil servant corps. An impressive
clientele network within Golkar attracted even more people to join
its ranks. In addition, Suharto’s role as Golkar’s ultimate patron
ensured its unity and strength. Suharto’s role within Golkar was
thus crucial as it placed him above all other patronage networks
which had the added effect of preventing factionalism. However,
Suharto was also no stranger to stirring up internal rivalries within
so as to ensure that no new power centers would emerge to challenge his hegemony.80

election since the formation of Golkar in which the military did not back that party”;
and Aspinall who mentioned that in the elections in Aceh some Golkar members even
actively castigated the military. See Marcus Mietzner in Indonesian Civil-Military Relations: The Armed Forces and Political Islam in Transition 1997-2004, unpublished PhD
thesis (Australian National University 2004); Gerry Van Klinken, “Democracy, the Regions, and Indonesia’s Future,” in Pemilu: The 1999 Indonesian Election, Annual Indonesia Lecture Series No. 22, Clayton: Monash Asia Institute (Susan Blackburn eds.), pp.
23-8. Edward Aspinall, “The 1999 General Election in Aceh’ in Pemilu: The 1999 Indonesian Election, Annual Indonesia Lecture Series No. 22, Clayton: Monash Asia Institute (Susan Blackburn eds.), pp. 29-42.
79. See Tomsa 2008 ibid, pp. 78-80.
80. See Dirk Tomsa, “Still the Natural Government Party? Challenges and Opportunities for Golkar Ahead of the 2014 Election,” South East Asia Research, Vol 20, No.
4, (2012), pp. 500.
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The fall of Suharto created an opportunity for smaller patrons
in Golkar to emerge as new leaders. At least three main factions
subsisted, divided based on ethnicity and region: the Sulawesi group
(led by Jusuf Kalla), the Sumatra group (led by Akbar Tandjung)
and the Javanese group (represented by Agung Laksono).81 These
three rival groups sought to undermine each other when in competition for Golkar’s top political positions82, such as the position of
chairman and the presidential candidacy. The Sulawesi group had
been reluctant to support Akbar’s vice-presidential candidacy for
the 2001 presidential election while the latter also tried to undermine Jusuf Kalla’s vice presidential candidacy with Joko Widodo in
the 2014 presidential elections by supporting the Prabowo Subianto
– Hatta Rajasa camp.83 The clientelistic approach between the various factions has since been a mainstay characteristic of the party’s
institutional dynamics post-Suharto. This situation put Golkar at
risk to internal factionalism. Eventually some of the factions actually broke ranks with Golkar as a result of the internal dynamics
within it. However, these breakaway splinters have taken a different trajectory by relying on the personal traits and characteristics of
their founders rather than that of a well-institutionalized yet impersonal party.84 The three most prominent Golkar’s splinters are
Prabowo Subianto’s Gerindra party, Wiranto’s Hanura party and
Surya Paloh’s Nasdem party.
Golkar had successfully transited from a former hegemonic position under Suharto to a functioning political party in a democracy,
although it had retained several aspects of its former dominance
including its comprehensive organizational apparatus, access to patronage and resources, a huge reservoir of professional cadres and
high levels of name recognition.85 In order to assert its new image,
Golkar held a party convention in 2003 to choose its presidential
candidate for the 2004 presidential elections. The Golkar party
chairman at that time, Akbar Tandjung poignantly mentioned that
81. See Leo Suryadinata, “The Decline of the Hegemonic Party System in Indonesia: Golkar after the Fall of Soeharto,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol 29, No. 2,
(2007) pp. 353.
82. See ibid, pp. 345.
83. See ibid and “Akbar Surati Kader Golkar Dukung Prabowo-Hatta [Akbar Persuading Golkar Cadres to Support Prabowo-Hatta],” in Inilah.com, 25 May 2014. http://
nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/2103875/akbar-surati-kader-golkar-dukung-prabowohatta#.VG82N4uUfTghttp://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/2103875/akbar-surati-kader-golkar-dukung-prabowo-hatta#.VG82N4uUfTg accessed on 21 November 2014.
84. See Chrisnandi and Priamarizki ibid, pp. 3.
85. See Tomsa 2008, pp. 181-3.
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“the convention intent was to prove that the ‘Golkar Baru [New
Golkar]’ jargon as a democratic entity can be trusted.”86 Thus the
previous stigma of being associated with the military and the New
Order had been essentially removed. Golkar continued to shine politically nonetheless. In the 2004 legislative elections, it once again
became the most dominant party by securing 21.62 percent of national votes (or 128 seats in the parliament).87 Golkar’s dominance
was to be seen in the subsequent elections by consistently finishing
among the top three positions despite the party’s inherent
factionalism.
3. Decentralizing the Executive and Devolution to the
Regions
Centralization of powers formed the basic tent of Suharto ironclad grip and its prior implementation was spurred on by a retinue
of circumstances beginning in his second presidential term (19731983). Signs of emerging elite competition then among those close
to Suharto proved to be a scourge. The Malari incident would provide the incentive for Suharto to further consolidate his regime such
that the apex of the New Oder would not be easily threatened by
the grievances emerging from society-based participatory forces.88
Following intentions of “socializing (memasyarakatkan) Pancasila
and Pancasila-ise (mempancasilakan) society,” a bill on regional autonomy was passed in 1974 as a means to intensify centralized rule
by providing a uniform vertical administration system across the archipelago.89 Within the bill wide discretionary powers were given to
the Minister for Home Affairs while Suharto had the personal right
to directly appoint provincial governors.90 This bill was to last for 25
years before it was upended.
While the Habibie government consisted of parliamentary features carried-over from the Suharto regime, this was to undergo a
drastic change. Perhaps better known more for his initiation of the
86. See Chrisnandi and Priamarizki, ibid, pp. 4.
87. See General Elections Committee (KPU).
88. The Malari incident (or Peristiwa Malari, short for Malapetaka Lima Belas
Januari, “Fifteenth of January Disaster”) was a student demonstration that took place
during a state visit by Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, from 15 to 16 January
1974. The protest was reputedly against corruption, high prices, and inequality in foreign investments but due to intervention by agent provocateurs, demonstrations became riots, which eventually turned into a pogrom.
89. See Nazaruddin (ed.) in Jejak langkah Pak Harto 27 Maret 1973-23 Maret 1978,
pp. 268, 311, 386 [22 July, 16 December 1975, 16 August 1976].
90. See Elson ibid, pp. 209.
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“big bang” approach to decentralization – particularly in its devolution to the regions – the structure of the Indonesian parliament
would also undergo some inherent changes.91 In the last days of the
Suharto regime, some attention was given to the idea of limited degree of decentralization, although no significant progress had been
made to implement the idea.92 On the contrary, President Habibie
gave much attention and overwhelming precedence to the idea of
large-scale decentralization almost immediately after he was sworn
in.
Given the tenuous political circumstances then in 1998/99,
rapid-fire decentralization was one of the ways seen as having an
ameliorating effect while achieving the additional purpose of undercutting potential separatist challenges. Two definitive laws were
passed in 1999 that would change the regional landscape of Indonesia. They were the Law on Regional Government (No. 22/1999) and
its accompanying Law on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions (No. 25/1999) which permitted a large
transfer of authority and resources directly to the district level, bypassing the provinces.93 The new regional government laws set
aside a limited number of fields for the central government including foreign affairs, defence and security; justice; monetary and fiscal
affairs; religion; and the potentially omnibus “other matters.” These
latter matters were clarified as “macro-level planning, fiscal equalization, public administration, economic institutions, human resource development, natural resources utilization, strategic
technologies, conservation and national standardization.” In other
words, the existing hierarchical structure of regional government
under the then New Order government was abolished in order to
be replaced by provincial and district governments having their own
exclusive fields of activity.
91. The term “big bang” derives its origin from the World Bank. According to
Anwar Shah, a World Bank economist, a “big bang” approach comprises of a “holistic
(comprehensive)” approach that is “implemented at lightning speed”. See Anwar Shah
and Theresa Thompson, “Implementing Decentralized Local Government: A Treacherous Road with Potholes, Detours and Road Closures” in Reforming Intergovernmental
Fiscal Relations and the Rebuilding of Indonesia, edited by James Alm, Jorge MartinezVazquez, and Sri Mulyani Indrawati (Cheltenham UK/Northampton MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2004), pp. 317.
92. See Harold Crouch ibid, pp. 92.
93. See Crouch ibid, pp. 92. For official English-language versions of the two laws,
see http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/current_issues/autonomy/docs/http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/current_issues/autonomy/docs/ as a prefix to Law22_99_n_eluc.pdf and
to Law25_99_n-eluc.pdf.
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Following the implementation of the new regional laws, governors no longer exercised authority over district heads. They would
eventually be selected by their respective Regional People’s Representatives Council or DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah)
in which the provincial DPRD was only allowed to “consult” the
president about the candidates for governor as “government representative” before voting whereas bupati and mayors would simply
be elected by the district DPRD that was only required to “inform”
the governor of the election as a formality.94 The fiscal laws gave
regional governments greater autonomy in determining how funding could be used. It stated that 25 percent of central government
revenue be allocated in block grants (Dana Alokasi Umum: DAU)
which would be further broken down into 10 percent to the provinces and 90 percent to districts. In provisions that specifically
targeted resource-rich regions, the law was also liberalized to allow
local governments to retain much larger shares of revenues produced in their regions.95 These decentralization approaches resulted
in large transfers of funds and authority from the center to the regions. This is notwithstanding that the two separatist provinces,
Aceh and Papua, which were eventually granted “Special Autonomy” status that allowed them to retain much higher proportions of
oil and natural-gas revenues. The speed of the transitional process,
however, led to much disruption and confusion.
In a parallel fashion, both legislative and executive functions of
the government at the national level also underwent similar decentralization tendencies. During the Suharto period, the People’s
Consultative Assembly or MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat)
consisted of 500 members of the House of Representatives or DPR
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) with the addition of 500 more appointed members, all approved by the president while nominally
representing the regions and functional groups. The legislative body
or DPR, functioned as a “rubber stamp” for the Suharto government and was even described perfectly by Iwan Fals, a famous Indonesian ballad singer, as a “choir singing in agreement (paduan

94. Nonetheless, this system would change again after direct local elections were
instituted in 2005. It must be noted that it is also only recently (September 2014) that
direct local elections were aborted in favor of the previous system once again.
95. The provinces are guaranteed of defined proportions of the revenues produced
from their regions – in particular, 15 percent of petroleum receipts, 30 percent of gasrelated receipts and 80 percent of forestry, mining and fisheries-derived income.
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suara lagu setuju).”96 This sort of parliamentary formation is in conjunction with elections that were “effectively a legitimacy tool for
the New Order regime.”97 When seen together, the meticulously
controlled and manipulated election process disconnected the link
between the parliamentarian legislators and their constituency.98
Due to the implicit threat then on legislators implementing constitutional amendments without the approval of the military or
Suharto, legislation implementation was virtually nil from 19711997.99 This was to change drastically.
During President Habibie’s brief term, initial reforms on the
parliamentary system were instituted under the behest of Dr. Ryaas
Rasyid, assisted by a seven-member team of American-trained political scientists.100 Under the team, the electoral system shifted
from one based on proportional representation (PR) to that of one
based on a mixed system whereby 420 of the 550 seats in the DPR
were single-member seats while PR would be retained for only 75
seats. This was built on the belief that single-member constituencies
would make legislatures more responsive and accountable. Reforms
back then were also geared towards the holding of elections in 1999.
Mindful of the potential fallout from a fragmented body politic like
those of the 1950s in Indonesia, the team made sure that political
parties had functioning organizations that were “national” rather
than based on a single ethnic group or regions with separatist incli96. In an added note, the work of legislators then was also usually described jokingly with the five “D verbs” (datang, daftar, duduk, diam, duit) or “show up, register,
sit down, shut up and take the money”. For a comprehensive narration of the process
without the parliament then see Patrick Ziegenhain, The Indonesian Parliament and
Democratization (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 45-59.
97. See Hermawan Sulistyo, “Electoral Politics in Indonesia: A Hard Way to Democracy” in Electoral Politics in Southeast & East Asia, Aurel Croissant, Gabriele
Burns and John Marei eds. (Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2002), pp. 77.
98. See Adam Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (St Leonards:
Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 272.
99. Although at the start (1966-1971) and end (1997-1999) of the New Order 27 and
8 bills were proposed respectively. See Sisilia Srisuwastuti, “DPR dan Fungsi Legislasinya” in Indonesia dalam Krisis, Salomo Simanungkalit eds. (Jakarta: Buku Kompas
2002), pp. 198-200.
100. Four of the seven members of the reform-minded team (also known as “Team
of Seven”) had been closely affiliated with Professor Dwight King at the University of
Northern Illinois. Ryaas Rayiid had obtained an MA from Northern Illinois and PhD
from the University of Hawaii. Both Dr Andi Mallarangeng and Dr Ramlan Surbakti
had doctorates from Northern Illinois while Dr Afan Gaffar had gotten his MA there.
The team also collaborated with international experts on electoral systems such as Donald Horowitz, Andrew Ellis and Ben Reilly.
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nations.101 A threshold requirement was introduced to dis-incentivize the participation of small parties within the electoral process.
Appointed military seats were also reduced from 75 to 55. Most
changes actually took place within the Upper House of the People’s
Consultative Assembly or MPR (Majelis Permusyawarah Rakyat).
It began with some slight changes to the composition of the powerful MPR, once dominated by Suharto’s cronies and the military.
These include the replacement of less controversial figures of the
New Order that had not been influenced by nepotistic practices
under Suharto.102 This was followed by legal changes in specific
MPR decisions to put to end the selection of MPR members by the
president.103 In conjunction to the new reformasi era, a democratic
impetus had been imbued into the new MPR decisions including
castigation against the dominance of the executive branch and the
large gap between center and periphery.104 These changes within
the MPR also heralded changes within the reformasi structure
whereby the parliament and political parties are the new key players in Indonesian politics.105
Initial changes within the structure of the parliament changed
the balance of power between the initial powerful executive (comprising of the MPR and cabinet positions) and the legislative (comprising of the DPR and DPRD), affected by the Law on Structure
and Composition of the MPR, DPR and DPRD (Regional Parliaments, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah). While the MPR held an
overweening power over the appointment of the president among
other things, its executive power and influence were curbed.106 The
reformist team reduced the number of regional and social group
representatives from 500 to 200, bringing down the MPR numbers
from 1000 to 700.107 The DPR was also imbued with new powers
comprising of the right to establish regulations with the president,
enacting the National Budget with the president and conducting su101. See Crouch ibid, pp. 47-8.
102. See Ziegenhain ibid, pp. 80-2.
103. Article 1(1) of MPR Decision no. VII/MPR/1998 ruled that the regional representatives (utusan daerah) should be elected by the provincial parliaments and the social groups’ representatives (utusan golongan) appointed by the Election Commission.
104. See Ziegenhain ibid, pp. 97-103.
105. See Greg Fealy, “Parties and Parliament: Serving Whose Interests?” in Grayson
Lloyd and Shannon Smith, Indonesia Today: Challenges of History (Singapore: ISEAS,
2001), pp. 97
106. The MPR during the New Order also consisted of the entire DPR plus 500
regional and functional group representatives all appointed by Suharto.
107. See Article 2 (2) of Law no. 4/1999.
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pervisory activities among others.108 The idea was to use the DPR
to act as a check and balance mechanism with respect to the MPR
and other executive powers. In the process, the DPR had become
much more powerful than before.109 Hence, the devolution of powers during the early phase of reformasi took place at two levels: at
the regional/district level and at the national level. Essentially, free
elections for both the DPR and MPR were instituted.
4. Necessary Changes and Beyond: A Reflection
The reform changes that took place under the early reformasi
governments essentially severed the more uncanny features of the
Suharto regime, changing the face of Indonesian politics completely. The foremost to go were the dominating influence of the
military in the socio-political arena (dwifungsi). This was followed
simultaneously by the depowering of the regime’s election machine
Golkar and the devolution of centralized power in the national parliament and to the regions. In a matter of merely five years after the
fall of Suharto, the impetuses gathered by the necessity of removing
the vestiges of Suharto’s regime fast-tracked Indonesian politics
into an era now dominated by new players. These large changes
have in turn impacted various sectors of Indonesia, including most
notably within the political economy. Many scholars however lamented the fact that little had changed. These arguments centered
on the rise of oligarchy in Indonesia – the primary player that filled
the vacuum in the absence of centralized, authoritarian rule.
Among others, the tentacles of impending oligarchy in the
reformasi era had its incubation during Suharto’s New Order.110 Oligarchies were seen to dominate the scene post-reformasi. Arguing
that concentrated material power had been the order of the day in
which Indonesian politics would now be shaped by, Winters argued
that pribumi oligarchs, fostered under what is termed the second
stage of oligarchic expansion under Suharto’s New Order, now ran
the show.111 Necessity had by now lost its compulsion and what re108. According to Article 33 Paragraph 33 (3), the DPR now had to rights to: require
information from the President, conduct investigations, amend draft laws, make statements and opinions, propose draft laws, determine the DPR’s budget and propose candidates for a certain posts specified by regulations.
109. See Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 86.
110. See Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz ibid, pp. 54-61.
111. See Jeffrey Winters, Oligarchy (Northwestern University: Cambridge 2011), pp.
163-6.
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forms that eventually came about can be those that were increasingly seen expediently as machinations of a different nature.
Reforms still continued apace in what is known as the “politicsas-usual” phase of democratization in Indonesia. By 2004, reforms
were no longer carried out in the background of a crisis and uncertain future for the reformasi state. Following drastic decentralization and democratization measures instituted by the early reformasi
administrations especially by the Habibie government, the crisis
was not over but was perceived as “chronic and not acute”.112 As
the impetus for reform dissipates, what is seen as reforms in the
“democratic consolidation” phase post-reformasi can be summed
up as that of a compromise amongst the self-interests of the multiparty legislatures. Most extensive reforms taken at this stage involve those of imminent concern to the governing institutions
themselves such as the constitution, legislatures, elections and regional government. Fragmentation of various power interests including the installation of the multiparty coalitions has been the
main determining factor influencing the process and outcomes of
these “politics-as-usual” reforms.
IV. NON NECESSITY-BASED REFORMS
A. After Necessity: A Political Tug of War
The point of transition from a “crisis-ridden” situation towards
a “politics-as-usual” watershed point may be difficult to determine,
but it is generally assumed to be the 2004 direct presidential election that brought the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) administration to power.113 However, the period highlighting such a
transition is much earlier than that. Many scholars contended that
the convincing victory of SBY’s campaign marked the point which
Indonesia launched into what is known as a “democratic consolidation” phase. The defining feature of that period – direct presidential
elections – was perhaps a natural conclusion of the intense democratization process that was driving reforms within the parliament in
Indonesia. Its advent was partly the result of backroom bargaining
by the various members of the present dominant multiparty legisla112. See the report of the International Crisis Group (2000) entitled “Indonesia’s
Crisis: Chronic but not Acute”. See also Crouch ibid, 337-9.
113. In particular Edward Aspinall writes that “the elections of 2004 brought to an
end the ‘transitional period’ in Indonesia’s politics that began in 1998”. See Edward
Aspinall, “Elections and the normalization of politics in Indonesia” in South East Asia
Research 12, no. 2 (July 2005).
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ture. However, we should not also discount that the character of
reforms had also led to other innovations that were unique to Indonesia’s decentralized system such as the direct local elections at the
regional level. All these changes served to aptly classify the election
year of 2004 in Indonesia as the longest and most complicated election in the history of democracy.
1. The Evolution of Legislative Elections
With the 1999 elections as the background, a process of trialand-error had begun in which democratization priorities had to be
balanced with the growing clout of political parties and increasing
bargaining power. As Habibie was eager to immediately hold elections after his inauguration as failure to do so would have had a
disastrous impact on his and Golkar’s legitimacy, Golkar was forced
to make substantive acquiesce to the demands of minority parties.
There was a real fear that a relapse to majority rule by the hegemon
Golkar, still vilified right after the New Order, would force smaller
parties to walk out and thus delegitimize the results.114 As a result
Golkar relented on three “crucial issues” – changing to a singlemember district in accordance to the PR system, banning civil servants from party membership within Golkar, and dropping military
representation in parliament – although they remained unresolved
until the last week of the deadline.115 Eventually the new electoral
laws allowed any party that could meet the broad criteria to compete, leading to 48 out of 200 parties formed since May 1998 qualifying. This was in conjunction to the given necessity during a crisis
situation the holding of elections was crucial for the administration’s legitimacy. The result is summarized in the table below:
114. Dwight King mentions that “Majority rule was trumped by small-party threats
to walk out, which would delegitimize the results.” See Dwight King ibid, pp. 68.
115. See Dwight King ibid Chapter 3. For the first crucial issue, a final compromise
resulted in an extraordinarily complex system under which the distribution of seats
within province-wide constituencies would be based on PR but individuals would be
elected to represent particular districts within the province. For the last “crucial issue,”
although some parties were vehemently opposed to military representation within the
parliament, some parties do not have such an extreme disagreement. Eventually a compromised was reached. The four key reform leaders, Megawati Sukarnoputri of the Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan: PDIP), Abdurrahman Wahid of the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa:
PKB), Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional: PAN) and
the Golkar-affiliated Sultan of Yogyakarta issued what is known as the Ciganjur Statement that called for the gradual withdrawal of the military from active politics over a
period of six years.
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Table 1: 1999 Indonesian People’s Representatives Council
(DPR) Elections Result116

Political Parties
Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP)
Functional Groups Party
(Golongan Karya, Golkar)
United Development Party
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan,
PPP)
National Awakening Party
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa,
PKB)
National Mandate Party (Partai
Amanat Nasional, PAN)
Crescent Star Party (Partai
Bulan Bintang, PBB)
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan,
PK)
Justice and Unity Party (Partai
Keadilan dan Persatuan, PKP)
Nahdlatul Ulama Party (Partai
Nahdlatul Ulama, PNU)
Love Nation Democratic Party
(Partai Demokrasi Kasih
Bangsa, PDKB)
Indonesian Unity in Diversity
Party (Partai Bhineka Tunggal
Ika, PBI)
Indonesian Democratic Party
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia,
PDI)
United Party (Partai Persatuan
,PP)
People’s Sovereignty Party
(Partai Daulat Rakyat, PDR)

Seats in the
Parliament without
Stembus Accord
153

Seats in the
Parliament with
Stembus Accord
154

120

120

58

59

51

51

34

35

13

13

7

6

4

6

5

3

5

3

1

3

2

2

1

1

1

1

116. See http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php/pages/detail/2008/11/Pemilu-1999http://
www.kpu.go.id/index.php/pages/detail/2008/11/Pemilu-1999, accessed on 20 October
2014. Stembus Accord refers to a system which allows fusion between political parties
that fail to pass the parliamentary threshold.
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Indonesian Islamic Union Party
(Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia,
PSII)
Indonesian Nationalist Party –
Marhaenist Front (Partai
Nasionalis Indonesia – Front
Marhaenis)
Indonesian Nationalist Party –
Marhaen Masses (Partai
Nasionalis Indonesia – Massa
Marhaen, PNI-Massa Marhaen)
Indonesian Independence’s
Supporters Union (Ikatan
Pendukung Kemerdekaan
Indonesia, IPKI)
Community Awakening Party
(Partai Kebangkitan Umat,
PKU)
Indonesian Masyumi Islamic
Political Party (Partai Politik
Islam Indonesia Masyumi,
Masyumi)
Democratic Catholic Party
(Partai Katolik Demokrat, PKD)
Total
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1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

-

1

-

462

462

From the point of view of elections, it was largely violence-free
and held in a euphoric atmosphere.117 Nonetheless, the election results were beset by many teething problems. Despite the over-representation from the avalanche of political parties within
parliament, it did not result in legislators being more responsive to
their constituents’ aspirations. It also marked the ascendancy of
horse trading (dagang sapi) and power sharing among the elites. In
particular, Gus Dur’s first cabinet – a rainbow coalition (kabinet
pelanggi) - reflected the power sharing among the elites as it had
representatives from the five major parties (PDIP, Golkar, PKB,
PPP and PAN) and the armed forces. In order to preserve his
power in the government, it also compelled Gus Dur to compromise with the other political elites. The same pattern was to be imitated by the Megawati administration.
During 2002 and 2003, reforms were slowly undertaken to provide amendments to the 1999 electoral laws. By then, Indonesia had
117. The term pesta demokrasi (festival of democracy) was widely used to denote the
electoral process, its first since 1955.
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steadily transited closer into a “politics-as-usual” circumstance in
which necessity had not been the expedient order of the day. The
few areas of contention for the 1999 electoral laws have been reducing the size of large constituencies, enhancing fairness in the conduct of elections and promoting democratic practices within parties.
However, the processes of enhancing the 1999 electoral laws had
now gone through a different phase and would require the compromised acquiescence of the various major political parties. While the
main parties in the DPR (now consisting of the PDI-P, Golkar and
PPP) would not accept a proposed adoption of the district system,
an “open list” version of the PR to replace the “closed list” gained
traction. The former “closed list system” works on the premise that
voters would simply select the party of their choice while seats
would be distributed between parties in proportion to the votes obtained. Correspondingly, the seats are then allocated to candidates
according to their order on party lists. Such a system received criticism for being open to manipulation by party machines which
would put candidates that are high on their list regardless of
whether or not they enjoyed local support. This meant that eventual
legislators tended to be clients of the party “bosses” in both Jakarta
and provincial capitals. It was also a known fact that many had
“purchased” their positions.
On the other hand, the “open list” system altogether opened
up another vista. The new system ensured that voters first select
their party and then choose their own preferred candidates from
those on the party’s list. It serves to loosen the grip of unresponsive
party “bosses” while forcing candidates to appeal for the support of
local voters instead of crouching behind party labels. This would
also aggravate party factionalism as candidates from the same party
would be competing against one another. The open list system naturally did not find favor with the party “bosses.” This inclination is
also evident with bigger parties like the PDI-P and Golkar who preferred to retain the closed list while smaller parties were largely in
favor of the open list system. The haggling, however, did not stop
here. After making some electoral calculations, Golkar abruptly
switched its position in favor of the open-list system but with the
caveat that the constituencies should be based on the 400 or so administrative districts. By then there were already 550 seats in the
DPR while around three-quarters would have consisted of populations too small for more than one representative and would thus in
effect be single-member constituencies. Such an arrangement
largely benefits Golkar as it has strong support outside of Java in
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which district populations are quite small which leaves Golkar to
dominate while other parties such as PDI-P and PKB with stronger
bases in the larger multi-member constituencies in Java will stand to
lose out. In the end a compromise was reached. Although seen as
“open list,” it did not deviate from the original closed list system.
Voters first select their party and also have - the option to choose a
single candidate from the party’s list, instead of all seats. The order
of the remaining candidates would be determined by the party’s list.
Evidently, a large proportion of the voters chose only the party and
did not bother with the individual candidates.
Another dimension which changed the political landscape was
the increase in the number of constituencies and subsequently the
number of seats in each of the provinces, especially the bigger
ones.118 Such a move significantly reduced the anonymity of candidates in the big provinces, which aimed at making politicians more
accountable to voters. North Sumatra became 3 constituencies
while West, Central and East Java in total had 10 constituencies.
With the rambunctious 1999 elections acting as a guiding post, the
electoral laws also sought to reduce party fragmentation in the legislatures. Hence political parties needed to establish organizations
in two-thirds of the provinces and two-thirds of the regencies
(kabupaten) in these provinces, instead of just one third. In 2004,
the threshold requirements of parties were raised to 2 percent as
the first basis for elimination. The number of parties that qualified
was halved to 24 after meeting all the eligibility criteria. With bargaining monopoly in the hands of the bigger political parties, the
possibility of non-party candidates was eliminated and the entry of
new players was restricted.119 It was not a surprise that 2004 was
dubbed the most complicated election in the history of democracy.
Results of the 2004 legislative elections are summarized below:

118. The number of constituencies numbered 69 under the new electoral law, containing between 3 and 12 seats that varies according to the population. Each member of
the DPR would represent populations that range between 325,000 and 425,000. The
largest 12-seat constituency represented more than five million people while the smallest three-seat constituency can have less than 1 million people.
119. For an in-depth analysis of the political situation during the 2004 elections see
Stephen Sherlock, “The 2004 Indonesian Elections: How the System Works and What
the Parties Stand For” in Centre for Democratic Institutions, Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University (February 2004). Accessed 12/11/2014: http://
www.cdi.anu.edu.au/_research/2004-05/D_P/Sherlock_Indonesian_Election04.pdfhttp://
www.cdi.anu.edu.au/_research/2004-05/D_P/Sherlock_Indonesian_Election04.pdf.
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Table 2: 2004-2009 Parliament Seats120

No
Political Parties
1
Indonesia National Party – Marhaenism (Partai Nasional
Indonesia Marhaenisme)
2
Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang)
3
United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)
4
Nationhood Democracy United Party (Partai Persatuan
Demokrasi Kebangsaan)
5
Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat)
6
Indonesian Justice and United Party (Partai Keadilan dan
Persatuan Indonesia)
7
Indonesian Democracy Enforcer Party (Partai Penegak
Demokrasi Indonesia)
8
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional)
9
Work Care Nation Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa)
10 National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)
11 Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)
12 Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi)
13 Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia Perjuangan)
14 Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera)
15 Golkar Party
16 Pioneer Party
Total Seats

Parliament
Seats
1
11
58
4
55
1
1
53
2
52
45
14
109
13
128
3
550

Despite the distinctly labyrinth electoral process in 2004, it
seems that the legislative elections yielded a much more slender
parliament, although still dominated by the behemoths PDI-P and
Golkar. The number of parties that won seats in the DPR declined
from 21 to 16. Both dominant parties have come out of the electoral
reform process relatively unscathed although both have suffered
losses to a certain extent when compared with 1999. The PDI-P’s
share of votes dropped from 33.8 percent in 1999 to 18.5 percent (or
109 seats) while Golkar dipped slightly from 22.5 percent to 21.6
percent (or 128 seats). Nonetheless, in the process of political bartering some new parties benefitted. Among them were the Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat: PD), a political vehicle for retired
120. KPU ibid. Note that the total number of seats in the DPR had increased to 550
from 462.
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General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the Prosperous Justice
Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: PKS). Both the Democrat Party
and PKS won 7.5 percent (or 55 seats) and 7.3 percent (or 45 seats)
respectively. The Democrat Party deserves some special mention as
it was the first of the ‘presidentialized parties’ to emerge. It was
established in 2001 due to the desirability of having a political party
vehicle in order to run for election. It is perhaps completely dependent on Yudhoyono as its chief patron. Presidential candidates form
new parties precisely because the system then gives advantages to
candidates who have the backing of parliamentary blocks. On the
other hand, the PKS is an efficiently organized Islamist cadre party.
Its cadres are mostly that of young, well-educated men. PKS is
unique in that it combines Western management techniques with
Islamist ideals.
By another measure the parliament turned out to be even
more fragmented than 1999. In contrast to 1999, seven parties won
more than 6 percent as compared to five. In total, the two leading
parties (PDI-P and Golkar) occupied 40 percent compared to 55
percent in the previous DPR. This was the start to a more formal
state of affairs of power-sharing in parliament that had its prototype
under the “rainbow cabinet” of Gus Dur and Megawati. It would
also pose newer problems such as the accountability dilemma of
new presidents coming to power and the cartelization of parties
given the new political configurations.121
Such a pattern of insipid competition within electoral reforms
trailed the 2009 legislative elections as well. While the basic shape
of the Indonesian democratic system had been established, details
of how the system should evolve into were still being hashed out.
Electoral law changes to the 2009 legislative elections sought to
tease out some of these conflicting issues.122 With the 2004 election
still heavily weighted in favor of party representation and control of
candidates, there were attempts at converting the current system of
a “semi-open” list to a “fully-open” one. The new law in 2008 provided for two important changes to the 2009 legislative elections
towards a full “open-list” system. Firstly, voters could vote for either an individual candidate or a party – a vote would be valid even
121. For more information on the accountability dilemma that subsequent presidents
will face, see Dan Slater “Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition” in Indonesia, October 2004:78.
122. For a comprehensive summary of the new electoral laws for the 2009 legislative
elections, see Stephen Sherlock “Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: The New Electoral System
and the Competing Parties” in Centre for Democratic Institutions 2009/01.
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if the voter did not mark the name of the party. Secondly, seats
would be allocated to individual candidates in order of their personal votes, provided they received more than 30 percent of the
quota for their district. These two measures allow voters to select
an individual candidate and increase the possibility of a candidate
with a high personal vote to take up a seat. If a party won a seat, the
seat should be given to the candidate on that party’s list with the
highest number of votes. Such a change had a huge impact on the
electoral process, changing the manner in which campaigns were
run. Those who thought that their election was secured because of
their respective placing on the party list now realized they had to
campaign personally to establish their own individual profile with
the electorate. The law essentially swung the balance in favour of
the individual rather than that of party-based campaigning. This
had the effect of weakening the central hold of party leaders while
increasing competition between candidates within the same party.
In addition, there have been attempts yet again to reduce the
number of parties through legislation. Law10/2008 requires that any
party that received more than 2.5 percent of valid votes would be
assigned seats in the DPR. In addition to the 2.5 percent threshold,
an effective threshold was also introduced to reduce the size of the
electoral districts. For 2004, the number of seats per districts ranged
from 3 to 12. In Law 10/2008, however, the range of district size was
reduced from 3 to 10 seats. The effective threshold of the largest
districts was increased by 10 percent, thereby placing substantive
obstacles for new entrants and smaller political outfits from entering the fray. With these new electoral parameters in place some
parties were barred from entering but this did not prevent 34 political parties from competing in the election.
A more visibly progressive aspect of the electoral reforms
before the dawn of the 2009 elections were the steps taken towards
affirmative action for women candidates. Since 1998, women’s organizations have called for the introduction of mechanisms within the
electoral process to facilitate the entry of women into politics as an
essential means for democratization and reform. Although female
candidates won just 8 percent of the DPR seats in the 1999 elections
(a figure that is barely higher than that of the seven percent representation of female candidates in the previous democratic election
of 1955), some strides have been made during the immediate postSuharto era to boost that figure. Following the passing of the 2004
electoral law, modest progress was made which stated that parties
should “give consideration” to making 30 percent of their candi-
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dates women. This clause was further strengthened with the introduction of the passage of Law 10/2008 that stipulated that 30
percent of all DPR should be female or one in every three candidates on the party list should be female.123 The new clause would
give women more chances to be elected as they would be better
placed on the party’s list and benefit from the rule that gave weighting to candidates high on the list. However, it was not as straightforward as it seemed given the new ruling that favored candidates who
had cultivated their own personal profile among the electorate
rather than based on the party list. Ultimately, the progress made
for affirmative action was deemed not adequate enough. On one
hand, the strengthening of the provision for the 30 percent quota
under Law 10/2008 ensured that all eligible parties met the requirement. However, the absence of sanctions to enforce the ruling
meant it was flouted by many parties. Results of the 2009 legislative
elections are summarized below:
Table 3: 2009-2014 Parliament Seats124
No
Political Parties
1
People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat)
2
Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia
Raya)
3
Prosperous and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)
4
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional)
5
National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional)
6
Golkar Party
7
United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)
8
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia Perjuangan)
9
Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat)
Total Seats

Parliament
Seats
17
26
57
46
28
106
38
94
148
560

As seen in the table, the Democrat Party has made tremendous
strides towards clinching a majority at close to 20.9 percent (or 148
seats) of the votes. This was a three-fold increase and it represented
123. This is also known as a “zipper” provision in international discourse on women
in parliaments, indicating that male and female candidates should alternate in the party
list like the teeth of a zipper alternate.
124. KPU ibid. Note that the number of seats in the DPR had increased to 560 from
550.
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how elite competition allowed some parties to capitalize on the vacillating electoral parameters. The other two dominant parties, PDIP and Golkar, suffered a further drop to their voting base at 14
percent (or 94 seats) and 14.5 percent (or 106 seats) respectively.
The rise of newer ‘presidentialized parties’ further split the cake.
The ability of the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) and
the People’s Conscience Party (Hanura) to divert votes from
Golkar’s traditional supporters is an important factor in this election.125 A notable point is that by the third consecutive legislative
election of the reform era, the parties that had been in power within
the DPR narrowed. Although 34 political parties competed for the
elections in 2009, eventually only nine parties won seats within the
national parliament. Legislative elections had come a long way
since electoral reforms were instituted in 1998. Reforms had indeed
altered the face of elections with political parties as its primary
driver of democratization.
With necessity-based reforms taking a backseat as democracy
in Indonesia consolidates, the contestation of power between winners of the reform process becomes more conspicuous. This was
seen in the political tug-of-war process and elite competition especially between the dominant PDI-P and Golkar during the implementation of the new electoral laws. At this stage of electoral
reforms, however, many pro-democracy advocates in the NGO
community and amongst academic and media commentators have
taken the position that political parties are instruments of oligarchic
forces whose only interests are power and materialistic gain. Rather
than to promote democratization, parties have evolved to be an obstacle to democracy. This is perhaps evident from the higher barriers of entry in the forms of the negotiated thresholds and “open/
close list” system that excludes other competition. Yet there are
noteworthy developments that ensured a greater democratization
of electoral politics despite the weakness of the political parties.
These include the fact that no sole party has assumed a hegemonic
position in the new party system with parties forced to respond to
voters’ resentment. The influence of the military had also waned.
Another subtle indication is the dealiranisasi process, understood as

125. For a greater in-depth study of the ‘splinters’ of Golkar, that is both Gerindra
and Hanura and later the National Democrat Party (NasDem) see Yuddy Chrisnandi
and Adhi Priamarizki “Explaining the Trajectory of Golkar’s Splinters in Post-Suharto
Indonesia” in RSIS Working Papers WP277, 17 July 2014.
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being a shift and weakening of the Geertzian aliran.126 This process
demonstrated that “the selection of candidates by political parties,
the decisions of voters and the partisan coalition building” in a lot
of cases were not the direct result of long-term loyalties derived
from specific milieus but of more pragmatic decisions made by the
electorate. The formula for coalitions is increasingly being based on
the sake of winning rather than tradition.127
The necessity involving the implementation of parliamentary
thresholds appeared initially to tackle the issue of an obstreperous
and fragmented parliament. In the first two elections after
reformasi, parliamentary seats won by various political parties resulted in fragmentation within the parliament. Thus, as rationalized,
the bars had to be raised in order to curtail the fragmentation process. Nonetheless, it must be said that having a smaller number of
factions does not ensure that legislation is carried out effectively
and efficiently as seen in results from the National Legislation Project (Prolegnas, Proyek Legislasi Nasional) of 1999-2009. During
the 1999 – 2004 period, the parliament only managed to create 175
laws from 300 Prolegnas bills (or 58 percent of the intended target).
A better performance is seen in the 2004 – 2009 period as it managed to ratify 193 laws from 284 Prolegnas bills (or 68 percent of
the intended target). Despite the smaller number of factions, the
2009 – 2014 parliament had the lowest performance of all. It merely
cleared 126 laws from 247 Prolegnas bills (or 51 percent of the in-

126. Aliran refers to Clifford Geertz’s delineations of the Javanese landscape into
streams of consciousness/systems comprising the abangan, santri (traditionalists and
modernists) and priyayi classes. The Geertzian paradigm places much emphasis on a
cultural interpretation of social identity and structure that did not always conform to
actual representations on the ground. Nevertheless, there was an attempt to translate
this abstract conception into a more corporeal dimension along political lines. In a generalized manner, correspondence to the respective political parties are as follows: the
priyayi with the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia), the abangan with the PKI (Partai
Komunis Indonesia) and the santri with Masyumi Party (Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin
Indonesia, the modernist variant of Islam) and NU (Nahdatul Ulama, the traditionalist
variant of Islam). In recent years, however, some political scientists have experienced a
shift away from the traditional aliran groupings. For a more comprehensive understanding of such the shift, see Andreas Ufen, “From Aliran to Dealignment: Political Parties
in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, South East Asia Research, vol. 16, no. 1, March 2008, pp. 541.
127. See Andreas Ufen, “Political Parties and Democratization in Indonesia” in Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Marco Bunte and Andreas Ufen eds.), pp.
160-9.
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tended target).128 Despite these poor legislative results, a smaller
number of parliament factions would have had the effect of reducing essential cost and time required for the purposes of lobbying.
2. The Introduction of Direct Presidential Elections
The original 1945 Constitution (UUD 45) authorized the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyaaratan Rakyat:
MPR), the regional representatives and social groups to elect the
president and vice president. Although the constitution was not
necessarily authoritarian, it did not prevent the emergence of
strands of authoritarianism as seen during the Sukarno presidency
and subsequently the Suharto administration.129 The country’s
“presidential” system was quite unique then as the president could
not be deposed by a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Moreover, it was also the parliament that was delegated the task of electing both the president and vice president. The New Order’s
restrictions and tight control on political parties further contributed
to the consolidation of centralized authoritarianism during
Suharto’s long administration (a total of 6 terms). With the fall of
the New Order however, it became necessary to make certain
amendments to the 1945 Constitution so as to expedite reforms that
will minimize the emergence of an authoritarian streak.
The amendment process faced great resistance initially from
status quo powers in the parliament, particularly amongst the military representatives and extreme nationalist politicians in which
many identified themselves emotionally and wanted to preserve the
original 1945 Constitution –seen as sacred and indisputable in some
instances. On the other extreme, some nationalists and moderate
Muslims concerned with the amendment process felt that by reopening such debates may open the Pandora’s Box for the re-emergence of divisive issues that had been thus far settled in the past,
most notably the issue of establishing a state based on Islam in the
Jakarta Charter.130 Cornered by daily demonstrations, riots and
128. See “Bayu Dwi Anggono: Terjadi Pergeseran Pemahaman dalam Pembentukan
Undang-Undang [Bayu Dwi Anggono: There is Changing on Understanding and Creating Laws],” in HukumOnline.com, 13 October 2014. http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt543b500c568f7/bayu-dwi-anggono—brterjadi-pergeseran-pemahaman-dalampembentukan-undang-undanghttp://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/
lt543b500c568f7/bayu-dwi-anggono—brterjadi-pergeseran-pemahaman-dalam-pembentukan-undang-undang accessed on 21 November 2014.
129. Harold Crouch, 2010, p. 44
130. Ibid p. 46-47
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limited control over the military, however, compelled an exasperated Habibie to resort to launching the initial steps towards making
some form of amendments to the 1945 Constitution in order.
Habibie subsequently lifted restrictions on the formation of political parties and promised to hold an early general election on the
basis of a new electoral legislation. A Special Session of the MPR
was convened for the purposes of adopting a decree to advance the
date of the next election that expedited the date from 2002 to “at
the latest June 1999.”131 By then the parties in the MPR already
had the broad accepted notion of the need to “correct” the “distortions” of the New Order period through limiting the powers of the
president and strengthening the DPR. Although some reforms were
undertaken during the four MPR sessions between 1999 and 2002,
it was clear that the MPR still carried the monopoly of power and
influence over the president. The MPR then adopted a series of
constitutional amendments that further emphasized its authority,
including the limitation of the president and vice president to two
five-year terms. Other amendments changed the language of particular articles to stress the authority of the DPR.
Direct presidential elections only gained a more substantial
currency following the dismissal of Abdurrahman Wahid. Although
this was partly the result of Abdurrahman’s alienation of both his
political enemies and friends since early in his term, it nevertheless
was also the culmination of early reforms efforts that sought to empower the DPR, inevitably changing the character of the constitution from its original presidentialism toward parliamentarism. The
ouster of Abdurrahman Wahid clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the president, who had lost the support of the DPR, facing
what was in effect the equivalent of a parliamentary style of noconfidence. To counter such a scenario, the MPR then adopted constitutional amendments that sought to redress the power imbalance
by reaffirming the presidential character of the system in its sessions in 2001 and 2002. The largest party then, the PDI-P, whose
chairperson Megawati Sukarnoputri was now the president, was
also particularly interested in the formulation of clear rules that
would safeguard her from a similar experience like Abdurrahman’s.
Direct presidential elections became a very distinct possibility
as the old dismissal procedure with its lack of precision was deemed
a violation of the national will. In the midst of strengthening specific clauses that would prevent a repeat of the rather arbitrary dis131. See MPR Decree No. XIV/1998.
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missal process by the DPR, a more fundamental change was seen as
the more crucial safeguard against a parliament slipping into parliamentarism – direct presidential elections. It was argued that a president directly elected by a majority of voters would acquire the need
legitimacy that was distinctly different from that of a president that
was elected by means of horse-trading between fragmented parties
in the coalition. Abdurrahman’s ouster made a clear point that an
indirectly elected president had no insurance against challenge from
a hostile legislature. Again, political calculations were well-placed
and in accord with the arrangement of direct presidential elections.
Golkar, as the party with strong representation in the regional government, could see gains in a direct election. To further consolidate
its case with a win in the first round of elections in 2004, Golkar
proposed that the leading candidate would need to obtain twothirds majority in the provinces in conjunction to an absolute majority. The PDI-P, however, was initially hesitant to support direct
elections due to the lack of confidence of Megawati’s prospects
under such circumstances.132 Eventually Megawati was persuaded
by the implementation, opting for a second-round direct vote. With
her endorsement, the presidential nature of the constitution was
strengthened and consolidated. Mandate would now be directly received from the people and the presidential position would be much
less vulnerable to the sort of pressures that had resulted in the dismissal of President Abdurrahman Wahid.
The restoration of a purer form of presidentialism relegated
the role of the MPR to that of a symbolic body. Once perceived as
an effective source of authority on behalf of “the people” with
overweening powers to elect and dismiss the president, such duties
were curbed substantially and delegated to the president and DPR.
The MPR’s very much reduced role now consisted of: amending the
constitution, formally installing the president and vice president,
and dismissing the president and/or vice president in accordance to
the constitution. Two major institutions were also established in the
process: the Regional Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah: DPD) and the Constitutional Court. The DPD role was
mainly in considering and monitoring regional matters. The Constitutional Court’s main function was to assess whether the laws
passed were in accordance with the constitution. This was to be the

132. There was a fear that Megawati would not be able to debate effectively with
other candidates given her reluctance to be questioned in public about policy issues.
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foundation onto which Indonesia’s first direct presidential elections
were to be founded upon.
a. The 2004 Direct Presidential Elections
Following the constitutional amendments, a new Law on the
Election of the President and Vice President was required as it did
not previously regulate direct presidential elections. During discussions of this law, the two largest parties at that time, Golkar and
PDI-P, had a common interest in restricting the number of competitors. They proposed that only parties with at least 20 percent of
votes gained during the general election for the DPR be able to
nominate presidential candidates. The rationale was that too many
parties might nominate candidates and confuse voters. This also
theoretically implied that there could be no more than 5 pairs of
presidential candidates, even though on the basis of the 1999 election results, the likelihood was that only two – Golkar and PDI-P –
would predominate. Naturally such a proposition received strong
opposition from smaller parties as the conditions were not deemed
advantageous to them. Eventually, the threshold for parties to nominate candidates in the 2004 presidential elections was revised to 3
percent of parliament seats (16 seats) or 5 percent of the total
votes.133 This would be raised to 15 percent of seats and 20 percent
of votes in the later elections.
The new electoral clauses allowed more candidates from various parties to be represented. This led to the first direct presidential
election requiring two rounds of contests given the fragmented
vote. As no single party won even a quarter of the votes in the
legislative elections, it came down to presidential candidates seeking vice-presidential partners from different political persuasions.
In 2004, the first round of the direct presidential elections eventually had five candidate nominations from the political parties. The
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional: PAN) nominated Amien Rais and Siswono Yudo Husodo, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: PPP) proposed
Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar, and Golkar endorsed Wiranto
and Salahuddin Wahid. Meanwhile, Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi
were supported by the PDI-P. Besides the five candidates in the
first round, Gus Dur - Marwah Daud Ibrahim, which was supported
by PKB, also registered their candidacy. However, the pair failed to
pass the health test required by the Election Commission. As its
133. Harold Crouch, 2010, p. 66
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conclusion, retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and incumbent President Megawati emerged as the two candidates with
top votes at 33.6 percent and 26.3 percent respectively, qualifying
for the second round. Results of the first round of direct presidential elections are summarized below:
Table 4: First Round of the 2004 Direct Presidential Elections134
No
1
2
3
4
5

Candidates
Wiranto - Salahuddin Wahid
Megawati Soekarnoputri - Hasyim Muzadi
Amien Rais - Siswono Yudo Husodo
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - Jusuf Kalla
Hamzah Haz - Agum Gumelar

Votes
23,827,512
28,186,780
16,042,105
36,070,622
3,276,001

Votes
Percentage
22.19%
26.24%
14.94%
33.58%
13.05%

For the second round of direct elections, the Yudhoyono –
Jusuf Kalla pair edged out with a decisive 60.6 percent of the votes
compared with Megawati – Hasyim Muzadi pair of 39.4 percent. In
addition, Yudhoyono was also the leading candidate in 28 out of 32
provinces. The first direct presidential elections thus achieved what
it sought to claim, that is handing over the mandate of people to a
clear-cut majority winner. Yudhoyono’s administration thus acquired a high legitimacy. Results of the second round of direct presidential elections are summarized in the table below:
Table 5: Second Round of the 2004 Direct
Presidential Elections135
No
Candidates
1
Megawati Soekarnoputri - Hasyim Muzadi
2
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - Jusuf Kalla

Votes
44,990,704
69,266,350

Votes
Percentage
39.38%
60.62%

b. The 2009 Direct Presidential Elections
The second round of direct elections in 2009 followed a similar
trajectory that was set in 2004. The direct election format since provided impetus for the emergence of presidential parties. At this
stage of democratic consolidation, it had become the key driving
134. KPU ibid.
135. Ibid.
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force for the establishment of newer parties like Gerindra and
Hanura. The shift to a more presidentialized character fostered the
promotion of personalized politics and political parties – newer
kinds of parties that would not have taken shape under the pre2004 system of presidential election by the legislature. Nonetheless,
with the last direct presidential elections as a guideline, entry-barriers for electoral competition were further tightened. Based on the
2008 Law on Presidential Elections, presidential candidates have to
be nominated by a political party or coalition of political parties
that gained 25 percent of popular vote or 20 percent of the total
seats in the DPR.136 This would logically imply that instead of five
candidate pairs, only a maximum of 4 candidates pairs are now allowed to contest. Such implementation allowed for the possibility of
only one round of elections. Contestation for the second round of
direct presidential elections then entered an unprecedented personalized phase often seen as a “beauty contest.”137 Predictably, the
2009 presidential election was concluded in a single round as the
Yudhoyono - Boediono pair managed to secure more than 50% of
the votes. Personal charisma now became the basis for future presidential contestations as Yudhoyono’s charisma was reinforced by
the general public satisfaction with his policies. This election was to
set a precedent for the future direct elections. Results of the 2009
direct presidential elections are summarized below:
Table 6: 2009 Presidential Elections Result138
No
Candidates
1
Megawati - Prabowo Subianto
2
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Boediono
3
Jusuf Kalla – Wiranto

Votes
32.548.105
73.874.562
15.081.814

Votes
Percentage
26.79%
60.80%
12.41%

As necessity-based reforms transits into a “politics-as-usual”
phase, political calculations had been the order of the day. This was
also a clear demonstration of the genesis and evolution of direct
136. See Law No. 42 on Presidential Elections Year 2008.
137. A survey conducted in June 2008 by the national newspaper Kompas showed
that 49.3 percent of respondents would vote on the basis of the candidates’ personal
charisma.
138. Ibid. See also Rizal Sukma, “Indonesian Politics in 2009: Defective Elections,
Resilient Democracy” in Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2009:
317-36.
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presidential elections. Despite the intervention of dominant parties
to extend their hold over the electoral process, the direct presidential elections experience can be considered a democratic gain and
innovation post-reformasi that is ironically entering into a less than
conducive phase for substantial reforms. While dominant parties
have influenced the process by lobbying for a stricter threshold for
a higher barrier on entry; a parallel development in the form of
direct regional/local elections neutralized the elite political contest.
3. The Emergence of Direct Local Elections
The implementation of local regional elections was one of the
later steps that the reformasi government took that relates closely
with the overall decentralization process since the fall of Suharto.
The decentralization process in the early stages facilitated a shift in
territoriality in the form of new provinces and districts. In 1996,
Indonesia had 26 provinces and 293 districts or kabupaten, whereas
by June 2003 there were 30 provinces and 393 kabupatens (without
the partitioning of Papua).139 The creation of new provinces allowed for the creation of new seats in the Regional People’s Representatives Council or DPRD. With laws promulgated in 1999 as a
progenitor, it allowed more powers to the DPRD in the selection of
their own candidates and budget in the various regions and municipalities.140 Spreading government to all parts of Indonesia and accommodating regional differences, regional aspirations and
139. Most of the new provinces including West Irian Jaya, North Maluku, Banten,
Bangka-Belitung, Gorontalo and West Sulawesi were approved in 2000. The Riau Islands province was created in 2002. See Ehito Kimura, Political Change and Territoriality in Indonesia: Provincial Proliferation (New York: Routledge Contemporary
Southeast Asia Series, 2013), pp. 61-5. See also Muriel Charras, “The Reshaping of the
Indonesian Archipelago after 50 years of Regional Imbalance” in Maribeth Erb,
Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Carole Faucher eds., Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia (New York: RoutledgeCurzon Contemporary Southeast Asia Series 2005), pp. 94104.
140. In particular, Laws no. 22/1999 and no. 25/1999 were instrumental in spearheading Indonesia’s decentralization specific to the DPRD. Under the new law, it offered
the election of members of local parliaments (DPRD) among the local citizenry, primarily from candidates offered by authorized political parties. The DPRD in turn were to
elect the local bupati or mayor (and in the case of the provincial-level DPRD, the governor). The mayor/bupati is then accountable to the DPRD or local parliament and
must present periodic accountability reports. The DPRD itself is also responsible for
the formulation of the budget of the kabupaten and the municipality as well as in formulating other legislation. The DPRD ‘supervises’ the implementation of bylaws/edicts.
See Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 75-80.
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regional demands within the confines of the unitary state were the
primary objectives of the decentralization program and its “Big
Bang” approach.141 Before 2004, appointments at the local level
(provinces, regencies/kabupaten, cities/kota and districts/kecamatan) were conducted via the DPRD. Although widespread anticipation was initially held for the “good governance” argument,
which propounded the promise that local government would be
more responsive to the needs and expectations of their constituencies, expectations fell far short.142 Similar to the national-level electoral changes, the introduction of regional autonomy laws in a
“politics-as-usual” atmosphere introduced some significant procedural changes, but it did not the prevent dominant political elites
from the New Order of interfering to their advantage. According to
Vedi Hadiz, the “predatory interests nurtured under the Suharto
regime’s formerly vast, centralized system of patronage. . . have reconstituted themselves through new alliances, nationally and locally, and captured the institutions of Indonesia’s democracy to
further their objectives.”143 In line with the Hadiz argument, corruption in the local government had become quite pervasive. The
Golkar Party especially has been a major player in these local elections that are often won through the “buying” of support. PDI-P
also engaged in some form of money politics.
The failure of the DPRD became patently obvious when regional heads presented “accountability reports” to the DPRD and
when new heads were elected. It had become somewhat of a familiarity that the dismissal of “accountability reports” by local candidates by the DPRD implied that a payment had not been met. It
became customary that regional heads had to be willing to pay
members of the DPRD a fee to withdraw their threat. Some even
141. Gerald S. Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem,
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing, 2009, pp. 1.
142. Ryaas Rasyid, Chief architect of the “Big Bang” Approach to decentralization
was protective of the virtues of decentralization. In response to those who claim that
decentralization would only transfer power from corrupt central officials to corrupt regional heads, he responded with: “That means that you think the DPRD is stupid, the
journalists are stupid, the NGOs are stupid, the parties are stupid because they can be
fooled by the corrupt head of a region. I don’t believe that, How can you be corrupt if
you are abused every day, your name is in the newspapers, you are faced with demonstrations, and the DPRD can bring you down when you are wrong?” See Kompas, 19
December 2000.
143. See Vedi R. Hadiz, “Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique
of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives” in Development and Change 35, no. 4 (2004), pp.
711.
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went as far to say that “accountability reports” functioned as “no
more than fields for extortion by members of legislatures.”144 In
several cases, rumours of “money politics” emerged whenever the
successful candidates did not herald from the party that held the
most seats form the assembly. Signs of a changing atmosphere began to emerge in 2000 when the MPR decided to amend the constitution to provide for “the democratic election” of governors and
district heads. Nonetheless, it was only with the ratification of the
law on regional elections (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah or Pilkada) in
2004 that had dramatically changed the elections pattern at the regional level as it allowed direct regional elections for governors,
mayors, and municipalities. Changes to the 1999 legislation were a
product of conflicts related to a growing challenge to the authority
of Jakarta (and provincial governors) by the district chiefs and mayors. The legislative changes prescribed both the desire to rein in
those local candidates and the inclination for aspiring local political
elites to gain institutional independency.145 However, it was not
perfect. Law No. 32/2004 is quite ambiguous, opening itself to different interpretations which necessitated supplementary explanations and regulations. It had also contained elements of a possible
re-centralization.146
In 2005, local direct elections also known as the pilkada, however, proceeded apace. There were few disturbances in general, although the non-voting rate was also at a high of 31.3 percent.147
Studies of the phenomena of local elections at the regional level
have been largely location-specific. In many of these studies, the
party-candidate relationship had been a huge concern. It has been
found that the candidate running for a position within the local constituency has been largely independent of the party. The individual
now became the center of focus.148 To an extent, the individualization of elections has been accompanied by the rise of primordial
144. See Kompas, 5 February 2003.
145. Maryanov ibid pp. 80.
146. For example, Law No. 32/2004 authorizes the central government to rescind local regulations that violate the Constitution or higher laws (Article 145). See also
Nankyung Choi, “Indonesia’s Direct Local elections: Background and Institutional
Framework” in RSIS Working Papers, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
30 August 2007.
147. The rate of non-voters in the first round of the direct presidential election was
21.8 percent and 26.3 percent in the second round.
148. See Michael Buehler and Paige Tan, “Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province” in Indonesia 84 (October 2007).
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and communal conflict, following calls for putra daerah, or the filling of local positions with native sons.149 There has also been a parallel development in the form of the emergence of decentralized
political dynasties at the local level as direct elections proceeded in
the coming years.150 Apart from the sheer complexity of the elections due to its scale, there was a growing problem of the extremely
high costs involved in the massive voting process. Money politics
proliferated. In 2013, a study from the Indonesian Public Institute
(IPC) showed that a candidate needed to spend approximately between 20 billion Rupiah (1.64 million USD) to 50 billion Rupiah
(4.1 million USD) for city level elections. Meanwhile, a candidate
running for the gubernatorial elections must prepare funds between
20 billion Rupiah (1.64 million USD) to 100 billion Rupiah (8.2 million USD).151
On the other hand, direct local elections had also served its
purpose by largely thwarting potential abuses from the DPRD and
allowing regional constituents to be more representative. While political dynasties persist in some regions, others had the good fortune
of electing local reformers and benefitting groups which were formerly neglected. Some of these candidates include Tri Rismaharini
(Mayor of Surabaya), Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or “Ahok” (Deputy
Governor of Jakarta, and now Governor), Ganjar Pranowo (Governor of Central Java), Ridwan Kamil (Mayor of Bandung) and the
current Indonesian President Joko (Jokowi) Widodo.152 For exam149. It is believed that only putra daerah are able to secure privileged access for their
respective communities in the allocation of resources and government positions. See
also Marco Bunte, “Indonesia’s protracted decentralization: Contested Reforms and
their Unintended Consequences”, in Marco Bunte and Andeas Ufen eds., Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia (New York: Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia
Series 2009), pp. 116-8.
150. A study conducted at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University has shown that there are at least 23 known political dynasties at the provincial and district levels throughout Indonesia occupying various
positions as governor, mayor/regent, deputy mayor/regent, DPR members, DPRD
members as well as members of the Regional Representatives Council (DPD). Families
hailing from local political dynasties include the Choisiyahs (Banten Province), the
Yasin Limpos (South Sulawesi) and the Narangs (Central Kalimantan Province). See
Yoes Chandra Kenawas, “The Rise of Political Dynasties in Decentralized Indonesia”
RSIS Dissertation (2012/2013).
151. See “Biaya Tinggi Kampanye Pilkada Dinilai Pemicu Korupsi” in Republika, 19
July 2013. http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/13/07/19/mq6zjb-biayatinggi-kampanye-pilkada-dinilai-pemicu-korupsi.
152. See Jonathan Chen and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Jokowi and Indonesian Democracy” in The Diplomat, 11 April 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/jokowi-and-
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ple, the city of Solo in Central Java had been the beneficiary of a
new breed of reformers hailing from the grassroots. As the Mayor
of Solo, Jokowi cultivated genuine rapport with his local constituents. The relationship that he enjoyed with the people of Solo reflected a new element of personal interaction and became his
signature trademark demonstrating that local leaders could transcend mere formalities and the rigidity of top-down leadership so
inherent in Indonesian leadership styles.153 This included Jokowi’s
popular blusukan style involving impromptu visits to certain areas
to hear directly from the people regarding their needs and criticisms
of the performance of local government as well as his populist “cando” (punya gaye) approach designed to build bonds with the broad
electorate. Jokowi’s strong popularity with the grassroots and wong
cilik (micro businesses and plebeians) in Solo and later in Jakarta
would eventually aid him in a whirlwind rise to the presidency.154
The pilkada process was the result of the extension of decentralization policy and a reaction to the abuses sustained due to an
over-reliance on the DPRD. Outcomes of the direct electoral process, however, were rather uneven. On the one hand, it led to the
widespread prevalence of voter fraud and decentralized political
dynasties that benefitted some, but neglected others. Nonetheless,
it also yielded genuine reformers who were truly representatives of
their respective constituents. As necessity-based reforms started to
roll back by the end of 2004, the emergence of a new breed of reformers at the local level due to opportunities derived from the
pilkada system provided a platform for new elites to rise to the fore.
This phenomenon of local reformers would not only provide a fresh
impetus to the increasingly stagnant democratization process long
dominated by the oligarchs heralding from the New Order but it
indonesian-democracy/http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/jokowi-and-indonesian-democracy/.
153. See Cahyadi Indrananto, Pemimpin Daerah Sebagai Agen: Dramaturgi dalam
Komunikasi Politik Walikota Solo Joko Widodo / Local Leaders as Agents: Dramaturgy
on Political Communications of City Mayor Joko Widodo of Solo, Postgraduate Thesis,
FISIP, University of Indonesia, June 2012. With the rebranding of Surakata (Solo)
under Jokowi’s mayor-ship as “Solo: The Spirit of Java”, the city became a magnet for
Arts and Music Festivals. In 2009, the city of Solo won the Indonesia Tourism Award as
best travel destination in Indonesia for culture and heritage.
154. See Jonathan Chen and Emriza Adi Syailendra, “Youth and the ‘Jokowi Effect’:
Strike while the Iron is Hot?” in RSIS Commentaries C013108, 17 June 2013, http://
www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO13108.pdfhttp://www.rsis.edu.sg/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/CO13108.pdf.
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would also eventually pose as the greatest challenge to the established powers.
V. 2014: A WATERSHED
A. The Rise of the Local
So far reforms in post-authoritarian Indonesia have treaded a
seemingly vacillating path. Necessity-based reforms formed the bulwark of the early reform initiatives under President Habibie which
were primarily concerned with democratization and decentralization for the sake of preserving the administration’s legitimacy.
Under circumstances seen as “crisis-driven,” agency over reforms
then rested largely with the desires for more genuine reforms, despite it being very much a trial-and-error attempt, both at the center
and periphery. Its effect was to dislodge any vestiges of the New
Order by setting up a wholly new political vista with new democratic rules and regulations. The advent of a “politics-as-usual”
phase signalled the beginning of a political tug-of-war between the
victors of the reform process. Many of these reforms appeared
“procedural” and were inclined towards boosting the powers of the
newly established elites of the reform era. At the same time, these
reforms opened up the possibilities for new entrants and provided
opportunities for a breed of locality-based leaders to challenge the
status quo, which had since settled on stagnancy.155 By this time,
many observers of Indonesia had mentioned of a certain “regression” and “missing. . . political accountability.”156 It seems that the
excited talk of reform has largely evaporated while being replaced
by disappointment about lack of further progress, entrenched corruption and the continuing stranglehold of a self-serving political
elite. By then, Yudhoyono’s popularity had also declined significantly: from 75 percent in November 2009, his ratings declined to 63
percent in April 2010, 57 percent in January 2011, 47 percent in
June 2011, 38 percent in September 2011, and 30 percent in May
2013. The apparent frustrations of the populace over familiar established elites provided fertile ground for the rise of a populist figurehead, one that is seen to be truly representative of the people’s
155. See Yoes Chandra Kenawas and Fitriani, “Indonesia’s Next Parliament: Celebrities, Incumbents and Dynastic Members?” in RSIS Commentaries No. 89, 8 May 2013.
156. See Greg Fealy, “Indonesian politics in 2011: democratic regression and
Yudhoyono’s regal incumbency”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 2011, 47:3,
333-353. See also Sandra Hamid, “Indonesian politics in 2012: coalitions, accountability
and the future of democracy”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 2012, 48:3, 32545.
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concerns.157 This underlying antagonism between established elites
and local contenders was to emerge and culminate in the 2014 general elections.
1. Events leading up to Joko Widodo’s “Working Cabinet”
Several changes towards the electoral system especially with
the advent of an “open-list” system and direct elections at the regional and national level have modified how Indonesians vote. The
effects can be seen in the form of a gradual erosion of party identification in Indonesia with the promotion of a growing individualism
among candidates.158 This candidate-centered trend is also prominently reflected in the party identification (party ID) numbers, i.e.
the percentage of voters who say they ‘feel close’ to a particular
political party in public opinion surveys. That number was 50 percent in 2004, but stood at a mere 15 percent in March 2014. Although money politics and familial dynasties have proliferated as a
result of the reforms, a new and younger class of leaders responsive
to local conditions also emerged – largely due to the pilkada system. Their rise was fortuitously assisted with an upsurge in social
media usage among the general populace and a generous coverage
by the press.159 One of the prime candidates who had enjoyed a
spectacular rise in popularity was Joko (Jokowi) Widodo. The city
of Surakata (Solo) had benefitted tremendously under his mayorship, having won several accolades including several heritage
awards. He was seen both as a visionary yet down-to-earth leader
who is close to the people. This quality put him in good stead when
he decided to run for the Jakarta governor’s seat under the PDI-P
banner with Gerindra’s nominee Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok).
157. See Marcus Mietzner, “Jokowi: Rise of a Polite Populist” in Inside Indonesia
116, Apr-Jun 2014.
158. See William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, “Leadership, Party and Religion: Explaining Voting Behaviour in Indonesia” in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No.7,
July 2007. Liddle and Mujani have provided strong arguments (of a bivariate, multiple
regression analysis) for the growing identification of individual leadership in the legislative and presidential choices of voters in the new Indonesian democracy. See also Dirk
Tomsa and Andreas Ufen, “Introduction: Party Politics and Clientelism in Southeast
Asia” in Dirk Tomsa and Andreas Ufen eds., Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (London:
Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series, 2012), pp. 1-7.
159. For a comprehensive study on the effect of social media on the candidates running for the 2014 general elections in post-Suharto Indonesia see Jonathan Chen and
Adhi Priamarizki, “Popular Mandate and the Coming-of-Age of Social Media’s Presence in Indonesia Politics Post-Reformasi” in RSIS Working Papers No. 268, 18 February 2014.
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Against all odds, the Jokowi-Ahok pair managed to oust longstanding incumbents Fauzi Bowo-Nachrowi Ramli in the Jakarta
gubernatorial election by 8 percent on September 20, 2012.160 It
also made him quite a political superstar and a media doyen.
Jokowi’s win was to set a precedent to come – that personal appeal
of a certain type of leader now counted as a crucial factor in votes.
Much of this was facilitated by his hands-on style of blusukan (impromptu visits, regularly visiting poor areas in Jakarta). This was
often personified as the “Jokowi effect” by the news media. Although his term as governor of Jakarta was brief, he was able to
kick-start several important initiatives together with then vice-governor Basuki. These include a new system of bureaucratic recruitment called “lelang jabatan” (literally auction of office position), a
universal health care program in Jakarta based on a Healthy
Jakarta Card (Kartu Jakarta Sehat or KJS) and improvements to the
transportation quandary in Jakarta such as the inauguration of the
construction of the Jakarta MRT and monorail. By now the political
winds had drifted in his favour. In a poll conducted in early 2013 by
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jokowi
was seen as hopeful presidential candidate although he was still a
governor. At 28.6 percent of the vote, “Jokowi” was way ahead of
his next competitor Prabowo Subianto (15.6%) and Aburizal
Bakrie (7%). He was even more popular than Megawati
Sukarnoputri, leader of his Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). His sustained popularity was to eventually facilitate his
bid as a presidential candidate under the PDI-P ticket.
Jokowi’s bid for the presidency, however, was fraught with
complications. Beginning with the legislative elections held in April
2014, Jokowi’s popularity was cited as a crucial factor for the PDI-P
to gain votes. The electoral parameters of the 2014 legislative election followed a similar pattern to that of 2009. Thresholds for electoral participation and votes were somewhat tweaked.161 However,
there were no novel changes to the overall electoral system. This
160. See Leonard C. Sebastian and Yoes C. Kenawas, “Jakarta Governor’s Election:
Implications for 2014” in RSIS Commentaries CO12180, 27 September 2012.
161. Among the changes for threshold on electoral participation were that political
parties must meet the following four requirements to qualify as contestants: They
should have (1) regional chapters in all provinces; (2) have these chapters in 75% of the
regencies/municipalities in the province; (3) have these chapters in 50% of the districts/
kecamatan (at the Regency/Municipal level); and (4) have at least 30% women in the
management of the central chapter of the political party. As for the threshold on votes,
Law No. 8/2012 stipulates a threshold of at least 3.5% of the total national valid votes,
upping the stakes from a threshold of 2% in the last general election in 2009. See
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resulted in a higher barrier entry of eligible political parties. Eventually 12 political parties qualified for entry. Seen initially as a
strong contender for the presidential nomination as a PDI-P representative, Jokowi’s shot at the presidency was overshadowed by
Megawati’s sense of entitlement as Sukarno’s daughter and therefore her perceived divine right to become the president of Indonesia once again. However, with Indonesia’s third democratic election
looming on the horizon, the party system had failed to produce a
slate of appealing candidates that would find resonance with the
electorate. The voters were presented with Hobson’s choice with
the usual range of rather worn-out or unappealing figures and the
possibility of a fresh but inexperienced neophyte (Jokowi) who was
reluctant to stand without receiving Megawati’s blessing.162 The decision of whether to field Jokowi would become a perennial occupation of the PDI-P even into the early pre-presidential phase.
By now, Megawati’s popularity running as presidential candidate for the PDI-P for the third time had significantly waned.
Steadily with public opinion shifting towards Jokowi’s favor, his
profile within the party slowly grew. He began regularly attending
party meetings dressed in clothes identifying with the PDIP’s prominent red colors. More importantly, according to Mietzner, “he
started to make references to party ideology and Sukarno, its
founding father; and he developed networks within the party apparatus.” It was also during this period when Megawati slowly and
systematically introduced Jokowi to her inner circle in a bid to
deepen her relationship with him. While the waiting and courting
game continued, pro and anti-Jokowi groups made their opinions
known, though not directly to Megawati. Nonetheless, she had
made up her mind. Although concerned that a premature announcement of Jokowi’s candidacy may open up the floodgates of
attack against him and his allies, Jokowi was proclaimed as PDI-P’s
nominee on March 14, two days before the start of the parliamentary election campaigns. Jokowi then entered the campaign as the
most popular presidential candidate, with the hope that his party
would also dominate polls by riding on his popularity. Nonetheless,
those numbers declined as the polls progressed. The gap between
his primary rival, ex-military man Prabowo Subianto, narrowed
Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki, “Indonesia’s Democratic Evolution: Political Engineering Post-Reformasi” in RSIS Commentaries CO13162, 30 August 2013.
162. See Stephen Sherlock, Indonesia’s third democratic transition: are the parties
ready for the 2014 presidential election? Centre for Democratic Institutions, Crawford
School of Public Policy, ANU, 2013.

INDONESIA

BEYOND

REFORMASI

59

precipitously. It did not help that PDI-P eventually underperformed in the legislative elections and did not manage to
gain 25 percent of the votes as envisaged.163 Results of the 2014
legislative elections are summarized below:
Table 7: 2014-2019 Parliament Seats164
No
1
2
3
4

Political Parties
National Democrat Party (Partai Nasional Demokrat)
National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional)
Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia Perjuangan)
5
Golkar Party (Partai Golkar)
6
Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia
Raya)
7
Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat)
8
National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional)
9
United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)
10 People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat)
Total Seats

Parliament
Seats
35
47
40
109
91
73
61
49
39
16
560

The 2014 legislative elections produced for the first time a parliament that was more evenly fragmented.165Although PDI-P reinstituted its place as the most dominant party after the Golkar Party
at around 18 percent, medium-sized parties held sway. PDI-P’s win,
however, was disappointing. Many analysts cited the apparent disunity within PDI-P and their unwillingness to cooperate with
Jokowi led to a lacklustre and disjointed campaign.166 Nonetheless,
PDI-P managed to form a coalition with the Nasdem Party by pass163. In a poll taken by the Indikator institute shortly before and after the beginning
of the campaign, PDI-P was at 24.5 per cent, and Jokowi would have won a three-way
presidential race with 56 per cent against Prabowo at 20 and Aburizal Bakrie at 9 per
cent. But these numbers declined as the campaign progressed.
164. See KPU ibid.
165. See Jonathan Chen, “Aftermath of Indonesia’s Legislative Elections: Too Many
Cooks Spoil the Broth” in RSIS Commentaries CO14075, 22 April 2014. Prabowo’s
presidential campaign had the advantage of using the services of a prominent American
public relations guru Rob Allyn. See also “The Selling of Prabowo” in Tempo.com, 5
July 2014.
166. See Ross Tapsell and Liam Gammon, “Field notes on the Jokowi campaign” in
New Mandala, 4 July 2014.
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ing the presidential threshold. With the PDI-P-Nasdem coalition
formed, PKB, Hanura and former Jakarta’s governor Sutiyoso’s
PKPI (the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party, Partai Keadilan dan
Persatuan Indonesia) also decided to join. The coalition eventually
started to split into two opposing camps. Jokowi chose Jusuf Kalla
(JK) as his vice presidential candidate in deference to Megawati but
made sure to publicly highlight the virtues of Kalla’s seniority and
his political adeptness. On the other hand, Prabowo teamed up with
Hatta Rajasa from PAN and formed the Merah Putih (Red White)
coalition with Golkar, PPP, PKS, and Yusril Ihza Mahendra’s PBB
(Crescent Star Party, Partai Bulan Bintang). The presidential election turned out to be a very close fight between the two coalitions
with Prabowo’s coalition almost tipping the scale in their favor.167
The Jokowi-Kalla pair eventually prevailed within a single round of
contestation (see table 8) even as the Prabowo-Hatta pair appealed
for their case to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court
rejected Prabowo-Hatta’s request for a judicial review. Similar to
his victory in the Jakarta gubernatorial race in 2012, Jokowi’s win at
the presidential polls was very much the result of volunteers from
the grassroots. The win for Jokowi was also seen as a crucial win for
democracy in Indonesia.168
Table 8: 2014 Presidential Elections Result169
No
Candidates
1
Prabowo - Hatta Rajasa
2
Joko Widodo - Jusuf Kalla

Votes
62.576.444
70.997.833

Votes
Percentage
46.85 %
53.15 %

During his campaign, the Jokowi coalition (known as Koalisi
Indonesia Hebat or Great Indonesia Coalition) put forward a few
significant ideas as evidence of his plans to turn Indonesia into a
great nation. One of his more prominent ideas is developing Indonesia into a maritime axis, spanning both the Indian and Pacific
Oceans. When the concept was first introduced, it was interpreted
in various ways. Some perceived the concept in the form of a tradi167. See Jonathan Chen, “Indonesian Presidential Election 2014: Tipping Point?” in
RSIS Commentaries CO14131, 8 July 2014.
168. Some scholars believed that the Prabowo coalition had the intention of rollingback the democratic gains achieved thus far in post-reform Indonesia. See Edward Aspinall, “Indonesia’s democracy is in danger” in New Mandala, 17 June 2014.
169. See KPU ibid.
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tional power-centric approach, where being a maritime axis is about
becoming a military maritime power. Others stressed a more economically-oriented approach by highlighting the improvements on
infrastructure in enabling the fluid movement of goods.170 Jokowi
himself has emphasized that the concept focuses on the latter interpretation, and has actively promoted such an idea during his first
official overseas trip in the annual APEC Summit and other encounters with foreign representatives as president.171 His team’s
ideas attained an even greater urgency and eventually took off
upon his inauguration. Countries like the United States and Germany have expressed their willingness to support the Jokowi administration in materializing such a vision.172 Indonesia’s stateowned port operator PT Pelabuhan Indonesia even went on to present the concept of an integrated port and industrial area in North
Sumatra. PT Pelindo II, Pelindo III, and Pelindo IV will also subsequently specify their development plans in the near future, in line
with the current president’s vision.173
Economic reform takes precedence in Jokowi’s campaigns as
well including tax reforms, cutting fuel subsidies, improving the
quality of human resources, streamlining process for business licensing and others.174 The president has an ambitious plan to spend
more on villages, education, a reliable health care sector, as well as
allocate more investment to develop transportation, ports and
power systems. In order to achieve such goals, the new administration needs to cut fuel subsidies which have by far absorbed up to
17% of the budget through the years.175 As president, Jokowi eventually managed to fulfil his promise of reducing the heavy fuel sub170. Budi Kurniawan Supangat and Dimas Muhamad, “Defining Jokowi’s Vision of
a Maritime Axis”, The Jakarta Post, October 21, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2014/10/21/defining-jokowi-s-vision-a-maritime-axis.html.
171. Rendi A. Witular and Hasyim Widhiarto, “Jokowi on World Stage, First Stop
Beijing”, The Jakarta Post, November 9, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/
2014/11/09/jokowi-world-stage-first-stop-beijing.html.
172. “US Willing to Help Jokowi’s Maritime Axis”, The Jakarta Post, November 20,
2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/20/us-willing-help-jokowi-s-maritime-axis.html.
173. Hasyim Widhiarto. “‘Think Big’, Jokowi Tells Ministers, State Firms”, The
Jakarta Post, November 18, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/18/
think-big-jokowi-tells-ministers-state-firms.html.
174. Prachi Priya, “Jokowi’s Economic Challenges”, The Diplomat, September 18,
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/jokowis-economic-challenges/.
175. “The Jokowi Administration: Indonesia’s New President Rewrites Political
Rules”, The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-jokowi-administration-1414430846#livefyre-comment.
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sidy scheme a month after taking office by increasing the premium
fuel price from Rupiah 6,500 to Rupiah 8,500; and diesel fuel from
Rupiah 5,500 to Rupiah 7,500.176 In the course of his campaigns,
Jokowi has also emphasized the importance of improving infrastructure to support economic growth. He has stated his plan to
construct 2,000 kilometres of roads, ten airports, ten seaports, ten
industrial estates and 5,000 traditional markets.177 In the energy
sector, the new administration emphasized the importance of renegotiating mining, oil and gas contracts with foreign companies to
provide better terms for the Indonesian government.178 In order to
further supplement economic development, efficient and transparent governance is needed. Jokowi subsequently highlighted the importance of bureaucratic reform. His record in taming Jakarta’s
bureaucratic inefficiencies offers a promising new method in the recruitment and management of the state apparatus.179
2. A Commoner amongst Elites
The initial formation of Jokowi’s “Working Cabinet” faced a
series of uphill battles even before it was inaugurated. Prabowo’s
Merah Putih Coalition (KMP: Koalisi Merah Putih) had emerged
again as a formidable foe, beginning with the usurpation of the critical House Speaker leadership under new terms as stipulated in the
controversial MD3 Laws (or Law on the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), House of Representatives (DPR), Region’s Representatives Council (DPD) and the Regional House of
Representatives (DPRD). The full implementation of the MD3
Laws may prove obstructive to the reigning Jokowi coalition and
his parliament.180 Barely before his inauguration, the KMP made
176. “Fuel Prices Increase, Inflation to Rise Two Percent”, Tempo.co, November 18,
2014, http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/11/18/056622699/Fuel-Prices-Increase-Inflation-to-Rise-Two-Percent.
177. Vikram Nehru. “Indonesian Economic Policies in a Jokowi Administration: A
Preview”, Boao Review. Accessed November 21, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/e
mail/Asia/img/Indonesian%20economic%20policies%20in%20a%20Jokowi%20admini
stration_a%20preview_final.pdf.
178. Maxensius Tri Sambodo and Alexander R. Arifianto. Analysing the Economic
Platforms in the Indonesian Presidential Election. ISEAS Perspective, No. 40, July 2014.
pp. 5.
179. Diaz Hendropriyono, “Jokowi’s Much-Awaited Bureaucratic Reform”, The
Jakarta Post, September 14, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/14/
jokowi-s-much-awaited-bureaucratic-reform.html.
180. See Jonathan Chen and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki, “MD3 Laws in Indonesia:
Sword of Damocles over the Jokowi Presidency?” in RSIS Commentaries CO14208, 21
October 2014.
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use of the MD3 Law to rule the abolishment of the pilkada system
in their favor – the system that had catapulted Jokowi’s rise from
humble mayor to president.181 Anticipating the apparent threats to
his administration, the “Success Team” (or Tim Sukses) of Jokowi,
now known as his “Transition Team,” was quick to spring into action immediately after the Election Commission (KPU) formally
announced his victory. The Transition Team – which consisted of
Rini Soemarno (Head of the Transition Team), Andi Widjajanto,
Anies Baswedan, Akbar Faizal and Hasto Kristiyanto – was tasked
to smoothen the transition process by various means, including joint
discussions on the 2015 State Budget. It is also in charge of translating Jokowi’s vision into a policy blueprint in different sectors by
involving numerous experts (that are clustered into different working groups or kelompok kerja/pokja) from all across the archipelago. Aside from developing blueprints for future policies, the team
is also tasked to develop the cabinet structures and screen potential
candidates for ministerial positions.182 Jokowi’s cabinet and basic
structure would differ in several ways from Yudhoyono’s cabinet.183
In terms of transparency, the selection process of ministers by the
Jokowi team was also one that was unprecedented and befitting of
someone outside the elite circle that values the opinions of the public to a certain extent.184 Nonetheless, Jokowi would eventually face
181. See Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki, “Why abolishing direct local elections undermines Indonesia’s democracy” in East Asia Forum, 9 October 2014. Nonetheless, Yudhoyono issued a government regulation in lieu of law (Perppu) to annul the
abolishment of the pilkada which took effect a month later. See “SBY Issues Perppu to
Annul Pilkada Law,” TheJakartaPost.com, 3 October 2014. http://www.thejakartapost
.com/news/2014/10/03/sby-issues-perppu-annul-pilkada-law.html.
182. “Tim Transisi Jokowi-JK Tiga Tugas Utama (Jokowi-JK Transition Team’s 3 Primary Task),” Antara News, 4 August 2014, available at http://www.antaranews.com/berita/447001/tim-transisi-jokowi-jk-punya-tiga-tugas-pokok.
183. One of the notable differences between the cabinet of both administrations is
that Jokowi and the Transition Team fused several ministerial posts into a single ministerial post. For example, the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Public Housing from the Yudhoyono’s administration is fused into Ministry of Public Works and
Public Housing. The Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Forestry is also
being fused into a single ministry. While several ministries are an amalgamation of different ministries, Jokowi also splits one ministry into two ministries, for example the
Ministry of Education and Culture into Ministry of Culture and Elementary & Secondary Education and Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education. Jokowi
also introduces new ministries such as the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs
to better suit his objectives.
184. Jokowi’s initiative to involve the Corruption Eradication Commission and Financial Transaction Reporting and Analysis Center in the selection process is commendable. See “ICW Nilai SBY Lebih Baik Dibanding Jokowi dalam Susun Kabinet
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an uncomfortable position of a balancing act between pragmatic
politics with an intention of breaking away from the mold of how
politics is often conducted in the post-reform landscape.185
Jokowi’s status as non-political party elite would soon be evident when it comes to determining the composition of his cabinet.
A report from Tempo magazine mentioned a “three-way tussle involving Jokowi, JK and Megawati” appearing during the formation
of the cabinet.186 The final announcement of his ministerial composition is quantitatively better considering that Jokowi initially announced that he will appoint 18 ministers with professional
backgrounds and 16 ministers from the political parties (See Table
9).187 Jokowi named his cabinet the “Working Cabinet” (Kabinet
Kerja).188
Table 9: The Widodo’s Administration’s “Working Cabinet”
Line-Up
Ministry
Nomenclature
(Bahasa
Indonesia)
1

Menteri
Sekretaris
Negara

Ministry
Nomenclature
(English)
State Secretary
Minister

Minister
Pratikno

Affiliation
(Professional/
Political
Parties)
Professional

(ICW Deems SBY is Better than Jokowi in Cabinet Forming),” in Kompas, 17 October
2014, available at http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/17/16425331/
ICW.Nilai.SBY.Lebih.Baik.Dibanding.Jokowi.dalam.Susun.Kabinet.
185. See Jonathan Chen, “Indonesia’s Presidential Dilemma: Can Jokowi Avoid the
Accountability Trap?” in RSIS Commentaries CO14171, 2 September 2014.
186. See “Not All the President’s Men,” Tempo English Edition Magazine, 27 October – 2 November 2014, pp. 15.
187. Even though newly appointed ministers such as Rini Soemarno, Ryamizard Ryacudu and Sofyan Djalil are not directly related to the PDI-P, they have long been
regarded as confidantes of Megawati and/or Jusuf Kalla. It also must be added that
there is no clear distinction on the term professional, as this term could also refer to
professionals that are cadres of a political party. “Latar Belakang Menteri Jokowi dari
Parpol dan Profesional (Background of Jokowi’s Ministers from Political Parties and
Professionals),” Tempo, 27 October 2014, http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/10/27/
078617247/Latar-Belakang-Menteri-Jokowi-dari-Parpol-dan-Profesional/1/1.
188. See “Jokowi’s Working Cabinet (2014-2019)” in Jakarta Post Headlines, 27 October 2014.
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2

Menteri
Perencanaan
Pembangunan
Nasional /
Kepala Badan
Perencanaan
Pembangunan
Nasional

Minister of
National
Development
Planning and
Head of
National
Development
Planning
Agency

Andrinof Chaniago

Professional

3

Menteri
Koordinator
Bidang
Kemaritiman

Coordinating
Minister for
Maritime
Affairs

Indroyono Soesilo

Professional

4

Menteri
Perhubungan

Minister of
Transportation

Ignasius Jonan

Professional

5

Menteri
Kelautan dan
Perikanan

Minister of
Maritime
Affairs and
Fisheries

Susi Pudjiastuti

Professional

6

Menteri
Pariwisata

Minister of
Tourism

Arief Yahya

Professional

7

Menteri Energi
dan Sumber
Daya Mineral

Minister of
Energy and
Mineral
Resources

Sudirman Said

Professional

8

Menteri
Koordinator
Bidang Politik,
Hukum dan
Keamanan

Coordinating
Minister for
Politics, Law
and Security

Admiral (Ret.) Tedjo
Edhy Purdijatno

Politician
(Nasdem)

9

Menteri Dalam
Negeri

Minister of
Home Affairs

Tjahjo Kumolo

Politician
(PDIP)

10 Menteri Luar
Negeri

Minister of
Foreign Affairs

Retno Marsudi

Professional

11 Menteri
Pertahanan

Minister of
Defence

General (Ret.)
Ryamizard Ryacudu

Professional

12 Menteri Hukum
dan Hak Asasi
Manusia

Minister of
Law and
Human Rights

Yasonna Laoly

Politician
(PDIP)

13 Menteri
Komunikasi dan
Informatika

Minister of
Rudiantara
Communication
and
Information

Professional
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14 Menteri
Pendayagunaan
Aparatur
Negara dan
Reformasi
Birokrasi

Minister of
State
Administration
and
Bureaucratic
Reform

Yuddy Chrisnandi

Politician
(Hanura)

15 Menteri
Koordinator
Bidang
Perekonomian

Coordinating
Minister for
the Economy

Sofyan Djalil

Professional

16 Menteri
Keuangan

Minister of
Finance

Bambang
Brodjonegoro

Professional

17 Menteri Badan
Usaha Milik
Negara

Minister of
State Owned
Enterprise

Rini Soemarno

Professional

18 Menteri
Koperasi dan
Usaha Kecil dan
Menengah

Minister of
Cooperation
and SmallMedium
Enterprise

Anak Agung Gede
Ngurah Puspayoga

Politician
(PDIP)

19 Menteri
Perindustrian

Minister of
Industry

Saleh Husin

Politician
(Hanura)

20 Menteri
Perdagangan

Minister of
Trade

Rachmat Gobel

Professional

21 Menteri
Pertanian

Minister of
Agriculture

Amran Sulaiman

Professional

22 Menteri
Minister of
Ketenagakerjaan Manpower

Hanif Dhakiri

Politician
(PKB)

23 Menteri
Pekerjaan
Umum dan
Perumahan
Rakyat

Minister of
Public Works
and Public
Housing

Basuki Hadimuljono

Professional

24 Menteri
Lingkungan
Hidup dan
Kehutanan

Minister of
Environment
and Forestry

Siti Nurabaya Bakar

Politician
(Nasdem)

25 Menteri Agraria
dan Tata Ruang
/ Kepala Badan
Pertanahan
Nasional

Minister of
Agriculture
and Spatial
Planning

Ferry Mursyidan
Baldan

Politician
(Nasdem)
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26 Menteri
Koordinator
Bidang
Pembangunan
Manusia dan
Kebudayaan

Coordinating
Minister for
Human and
Cultural
Development

Puan Maharani

Politician
(PDIP)

27

Minister of
Religious
Affairs

Lukman Hakim
Saifuddin

Politician
(PPP)

28 Menteri
Kesehatan

Minister of
Health

Nila Djuwita Anfasa
Moeloek

Professional

29 Menteri Sosial

Minister of
Social Affairs

Khofifah Indar
Parawansa

Politician
(PKB)

30 Menteri
Pemberdayaan
perempuan dan
Perlindungan
Anak

Minister of
Female
Empowerment
and Child
Protection

Yohana Yembise

Professional

31 Menteri
Kebudayaan
dan Pendidikan
Dasar dan
Menengah

Minister of
Culture and
Elementary &
Secondary
Education

Anies Baswedan

Professional

32 Menteri Riset,
Teknologi dan
Pendidikan
Tinggi

Minister of
Research,
Technology and
Higher
Education

Muhammad Nasir

Professional

33 Menteri Pemuda
dan Olahraga

Minister of
Sports and
Youth

Imam Nahrawi
(sometimes also spelled
as Nachrowi)

Politician
(PKB)

34 Menteri Desa,
Pembangunan
Daerah
Tertinggal dan
Transmigrasi

Minister of
Village,
Disadvantaged
Regions and
Transmigration

Marwan Ja’far

Politician
(PKB)

35 Jaksa Agung

Attorney
General

H.M. Prasetyo

Politician
(Nasdem)

Menteri Agama

While not a completely reformist cabinet with a few contentious names on the list, the Widodo Administration also faced a
polarized parliament. The KMP swept all of the House’s Commis-
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sion Chiefs and the Oversight bodies.189 Jokowi’s Great Indonesia
Coalition, sensing the impending threat, took matters into their
own hands by establishing their own version of Deputy Speakers
and Commission Chiefs. While Jokowi himself remained powerless
in the struggle for control of the legislative body, the brouhaha
within the Parliament effectively neutered the legislative body to
fulfill their task, which is passing legislation. This may not be the
intended motive of the original reform process when power is devolved from the executive to the legislative, but of the result of a
protracted period of rivalry and in recent years of the hostile reaction to new entrants to the political stage at the national level.
3. Revisiting Necessity and the Evolution of the PostReformasi Indonesian Polity
Political reform in Indonesia has come a long way since 1998.
While necessity was seen as the driving impetus behind reforms during the early reformasi years under a more extreme circumstance,
Indonesia has proven that it can move beyond its transitional phase.
Aguero, in his study of democratic transitions in Latin America,
argued that the initial conditions of a democratic transition were
decisive in determining the intended trajectory of a post-authoritarian reform.190 Indeed early attempts at severing New Order links
considered to be detrimental to reforms largely allowed Indonesia
to systematically move on towards a more stable democratic consolidation stage. The significance of these early gains should not be
downplayed within Indonesia’s reform path. Crucially, the institutionalized role of the military in socio-politico affairs was quickly
dismantled. At that time, civilian consensus at that time was adamant that certain features of the New Order had to go in order to
be committed to democratic reforms. This allowed for the subsequent unravelling of other New Order entities such as the hegemonic position of Golkar and the centralizing tendencies of the
executive. With several of the New Order implements neutered,
post-reformasi Indonesia readily worked on strengthening the foun189. See “Solusi Fadli Zon Soal DPR Tandingan (Fadli Zon’s Solution to House Dualism),” Tempo, 3 November 2014, available at http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/11/
03/078619189/Solusi-Fadli-Zon-Soal-DPR-Tandingan.
190. See Felipe Aguero, “Legacies of transitions: institutionalization, the military,
and democracy in South America” in Mershon International Studies Review, 42 (2), pp.
383-404.
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dation of civilian politics with the aim of preventing a return to
iron-fisted rule by proxy of the military.191
While necessity-based reforms served its purpose of radically
altering the Indonesian political system and in an often trial-anderror fashion, it did not eradicate the deep-seated clientelism and
patronage that was part of the political psyche. The subsequent periods after democratic transition thus involved a political tussle by
the victors of the reform process. This did not mean that reforms
were discontinued. However, it did mean that the agency for reforms was transferred away from what was required in order to prevent an internal crisis within Indonesia from breaking out to one in
which political calculations and one-upmanship became the order
of the day. While the first series of reforms can be seen as dismantling what was left of the New Order, later reforms ironically reflected an add-on of parameters that sought to limit and restrict the
playing field of political rivals in the form of greater democratization and decentralization. The outgrowth of new legislative provisions that emphasized an “open-list” system, direct presidential
elections as well as the pilkada were all symptoms of this new state
of affairs – competition among the new oligarchic elites of the reform era. While necessity by then had since lost its panache, the
new rules for electoral politics fostered a different kind of electoral
atmosphere – one that was increasingly candidate-centric and personalized, much to the detriment of the political parties.
This opening eventually allowed for newer social networks of
clientelism to form but also fostered the rise of new local entrants
onto the political scene. In a recent article, Aspinall commented on
the nascent rise of the brokerage network that no longer adhered to
the old rules of political patronage.192 In recent years, broker loyalty has increasingly been compromised by opportunist brokers via
predation and defection. With much of the focus now shifting towards the individual, the balance of power steadily tilted towards
the need for a capable broker or “Success Team” (Tim Sukses). On
a parallel development, years of democratic electoral politics has
191. In a recent essay, Marcus Mietzner compared democratic transitions between
Indonesia and Egypt. He concluded that a rapid return to civilian control was the main
determinant for the success democratic transition in Indonesia as compared to that of
Egypt which had fallen back into martial rule. See Marcus Mietzner, “Successful and
failed democratic transitions from military rule in majority Muslim societies: the cases
of Indonesia and Egypt”, Contemporary Politics, 18:28 (2014), pp. 1-18.
192. See Edward Aspinall, “When Brokers Betray: Clientelism, Social Networks,
and Electoral Politics in Indonesia” in Critical Asian Studies 46:4 (2014), pp. 545-70.
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changed the Indonesian voters’ expectations. Indonesian voters in
greater propensity have grown shrewd. This was, of course, assisted
by their agency for “pragmatism” and “transactionalism” very
much in their favor with the implementation of political parameters
and reforms that sought to increase the appeal of the personal vote.
Candidates are increasingly being assessed on their ability to deliver cash, goods or other more tangible benefits to their constituents.193 The “open list” system and the local elections at the
regional levels in conjunction with the rise of new social media in
Indonesia within the last few years implicated the need for a new
kind of leader among the constituents – someone who is in touch
with the grassroots yet savvy enough in embracing new methods of
campaign. Jokowi was certainly the beneficiary of the former and
readily seen to be comfortable with the latter. His surprising win at
the 2012 gubernatorial elections against all odds have been partly
attributed to the strong social media presence by volunteers both
on YouTube and other media fronts such as Facebook, Twitter and
Instagram.194
The evolution of the post-reformasi Indonesia polity especially
after necessity had lost its appeal was not always disappointing.
Elite rivalries had produced in the “politics-as-usual” climate
unique opportunities. In some circumstances, aspects of necessity
are still very much evident especially at the regional and district
levels in which rivalries between political parties were less set in
stone. Nonetheless, the vast changes in political landscape and the
vicarious effects of new social media threaten to upend the estab193. See Edward Aspinall, “Parliament and Patronage” in Journal of Democracy,
Volume 25, Number 4, October 2014, pp. 96-110.
194. See Diatyka Widya Permata Yasih and Andi Rahman Alamsyah, “The paradox
of virtual youth politics” in Inside Indonesia 118, Oct-Dec 2014. “Cameo Project”, a
team comprising of Jakartan film and photography enthusiasts recorded a self-made
parody on the daily travails of Jakartan life. It was uploaded onto YouTube and immediately went viral, drawing viewership of over 2 million. What stood out apart from its
slick, semi-professional production and well-coordinated storyline comically depicting
the unsavoury aspects of Jakartan life, is its unstinting support for the Jokowi-Ahok
(short for Joko Widodo-Basuki Tjahaja Purnama) pair. The group could be seen donning the pair’s signature chequered shirt in the video, street-dancing, singing and rapping over the cover song of popular teenage band One Direction?s “What Makes You
Beautiful” – edited in Bahasa Indonesia and retrofitted to appeal to the young. This
was followed by a similar barrage of other YouTube videos, Twitter accounts, forums
and blogs with their own brand of parody and support for change in the Jakartan metropolis. See also Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki, “Popular Mandate and the
Coming-of-Age of Social Media’s Presence in Indonesia Politics Post-Reformasi” in
RSIS Working Papers No. 268, 18 February 2014.
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lished leaders of the old mold under familiar lines of patronage.
This has led to a hardening of positions in a usually multiparty,
“rainbow” coalitional Indonesian parliament. The open hostility of
the Merah-Putih Coalition (KMP) towards Jokowi’s cabinet and the
general half-hearted support of PDI-P towards Jokowi’s presidential campaigns were symptoms of this recent development. Senior
cadres within PDI-P in the pro-Mega camp felt that Jokowi was still
the same junior figure in the party which he joined in 2005 in the
same year that he ran for Mayor of Solo.195 The KMP went on to
politically outmaneuver the reigning minority coalition of Jokowi
by its attempts at utilizing the MD3 Laws to reinstate their own
parliamentary speakers.196 The Golkar Party has also sought to reinvigorate their dominance as leader of the KMP following their
attempts at reversing the pilkada system from direct to indirect
elections. While the KMP controlled the majority of seats at the
national DPR level (See Table 10), Golkar had won more seats at
the DPRD level of close to 70 percent.197
Table 10: The Merah Putih Coalition and Indonesia Hebat
Coalition seats at the Provincial Level198
No
1
2
3
4
5
6

Provinces
Aceh
Sumatera Utara
Sumatera Barat
Riau
Jambi
Sumatera Selatan

Merah Putih Coalition
38
63
49
45
36
40

Indonesia Hebat Coalition
33
35
16
20
19
30

195. See Erwinda Maulia, “Sour Grapes are Election Victor’s Spoils for PDI-P” in
Jakarta Globe, 27 November 2014.
196. Setya Novanto, a close aide of the party chairman Aburizal Bakrie became parliamentary speaker of the DPR. See “Setya Novanto Ketua DPR 2014-2019 [Setya
Novanto, DPR Speaker 2014-2019],” Kompas.com, 2 October 2014. http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/02/02475091/Setya.Novanto.Ketua.DPR.20142019?utm_source=WP&utm_medium=box&utm_campaign=Kpopwp.
197. See “Hajriyanto: 70 Persen Perolehan Kursi Golkar di DPRD,” Vivanews.com,
7 May 2014. http://politik.news.viva.co.id/news/read/502443-hajriyanto—70-persen-perolehan-kursi-golkar-di-dprd.
198. See “UU Pilkada Sah, Koalisi Prabowo Borong 31 Gubernur [Pilkada Law
Ratified, Prabowo Coalition Could Win 31 Governors],” Tempo.co, 8 September 2014.
http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/09/08/078605241/UU-Pilkada-Sah-KoalisiPrabowo-Borong-31-Gubernur. See also “Staging a Political U Turn,” Tempo English
Edition Magazine, 29 September – 5 October 2014 edition, pp. 17
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7

Bengkulu

27

18

8

Lampung

51

34

9

Bangka Belitung

29

16

10

Kepulauan Riau

26

19

11

DKI Jakarta

57

49

12

Jawa Barat

65

35

13

Jawa Tengah

56

44

14

DI Yogyakarta

33

22

15

Jawa Timur

55

41

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Banten
Bali
Nusa Tenggara Barat
Nusa Tenggara Timur
Kalimantan Barat
Kalimantan Tengah
Kalimantan Selatan
Kalimantan Timur
Kalimantan Utara
Sulawesi Selatan
Sulawesi Tengah
Sulawesi Utara
Sulawesi Tenggara
Gorontalo
Sulawesi Barat
Maluku
Maluku Utara
Papua
Papua Barat

52
27
47
34
37
24
36
35
22
63
27
25
33
33
34
25
25
35
28

33
28
18
31
39
21
19
20
13
22
18
18
12
12
11
20
20
21
17

This combination presents an uncanny alliance between the
once-hegemonic party and a coalition bent on disrupting the current parliament. Abolishing the pilkada system under a flimsy pretext was not well-received by the public. A recent poll by the
Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI) showed that more than 81 percent
of participants felt that a local leader must be directly elected by the
people without any interference from the DPRD. Much blame was
apportioned to ex-President Yudhoyono who promptly issued Government Regulations in Lieu of Law (Peraturan Presiden Pengganti
Undang-Undang, Perppu) to repeal revisions on the Pilkada Law
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temporarily.199 It lasts until the next round of the DPR’s General
Assembly and the likelihood of a further battle in the DPR would
be imminent.200
In all likelihood, the driving force of a “crisis-ridden” environment that necessitates change may have dissipated. Nonetheless,
apropos to a “politics-as-usual” situation, much has also shifted
within the landscape of Indonesian politics that is increasingly reflective of the need for a substantially different kind of leadership.
With agency rather than passivity a growing feature of the various
local constituents due to the twin effects of an individualization and
increased scale of elections propped by the nascent rise of new social media outlets, there is a need to “blend in with the times.”201
Elites of the old patronage system (namely money politics, predatory interests and at times violence) who relied less on representativeness among the wong cilik (commoners or “little people”) and
the rousing popularity that accompanied it even as Indonesia’s political structure drifts toward that direction, risks losing touch in a
political atmosphere that hinges a lot more on aspects of vertical
accountability. Vertical accountability, or the reciprocal relationship between the masses and the elites, stresses on the responsiveness to the common will of the constituency.202 This runs counter to
the entrenched patronage politics of the early reform period – a
visible continuation of leadership patterns of the New Order – that
seeks to downplay the newfound aspects of greater local agency.
199. See “SBY Issues Perppu to Annul Pilkada,” in The Jakarta Post, 3 October
2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/03/sby-issues-perppu-annul-pilkadalaw.html.
200. “Berlaku Sementara, Perppu Masih Butuh Restu DPR,” in Metrotvnews.com,
13 October 2014, http://news.metrotvnews.com/read/2014/10/13/304308/berlaku-sementara-perppu-masih-butuh-restu-dpr.
201. Machiavelli in The Discourses mentioned about the need for men to “adapt
oneself to the times if one wants to enjoy good fortune”. Thus the theme of necessity
runs through even in a “politics-as-usual” situation. Using the example of Fabius Maximus, he cites two reasons why one cannot change one’s ways. First, it is the impossibility of going against what nature inclines one to. Second, having got on well by adopting
a certain line of conduct, it is impossible to persuade one that they can get on well by
acting otherwise. He went on to reiterate that the downfall of cities come about because
institutions in republics do not change with the times, but change very slowly because it
is more painful to change them since it is necessary to wait until the whole republic is in
a state of upheaval. See Machiavelli, The Discourses (Book III.9).
202. Vertical accountability refers to the reciprocal relationship linking masses and
the elites – a bind that establishes itself most prominently via the ballot box. See Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy” in Journal of Democracy 5, 1 (1994): 55-69.
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VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY
IS INDONESIA?

Returning back to the introduction, the main puzzle of the paper is in the identification of the current political polity of postreformasi Indonesia. Earlier we have seen the onset of different circumstances that have led to different reform trajectories. For the
first instance, it was seen as necessary that vestiges of the New Order had to go given the parlous and potentially precarious state of
affairs. While necessity-based reforms had succeeded to a certain
extent in severing what was left of the Suharto’s regime (the military’s dwi-fungsi role, the hegemony of Golkar as well as decentralizing the executive and regions), Indonesia had transited into a
different phase. As a “politics-as-usual” atmosphere re-dominated
the political landscape, reforms entered into a wholly different trajectory whereby rivalry between the new elites of reformasi became
the order of the day. While the pace of reform was not as qualitatively swift or conclusive, its scope and variety had ironically increased as the democratic consolidation phase set in. Both direct
elections at the national and regional level emerged as a result.
These new democratic varieties quite novel in their implementation
gradually changed the existing political configuration that led to the
rise of the local . Thus one can see the vacillating “steps forward”
(necessity-based) in the early stages of reformasi and “steps backward” (non necessity-based) trajectories of the period whereby a
modicum of stability had set in. Looking back, several political
scientists have sought to define this complex polity of Indonesia in
various shades. Some have insisted that Indonesia post-reformasi
was not very different from New Order Indonesia and cited the nature of democracy as one that is distinctly patrimonial, even predatory, or one that is still very much entrenched within the politics of
patronage.203 Others have been more optimistic of the developments Indonesia took since the fall of the New Order. These scholars often cite the prevalence of popular agency in bringing about

203. For the case of a democracy termed as “patrimonial” see Douglas Webber, ibid.
For what is defined as a “patronage democracy” in Indonesia see Gerry van Klinken,
ibid. See also Syarif Hidayat, “Pilkada, money politics and the dangers of “informal
governance” practices” in M. Erb and P. Sulistiyanto (eds), Deepening Democracy in
Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 125-46.
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change to the polity and posing a few challenges to the dominant
oligarchs who had seen filled in the vacuum left behind.204
These scholars of differing persuasions that had qualitatively
assessed the state of democracy in Indonesia have approached postreform Indonesia with opposing lenses when it comes to their perceptions in viewing democratic developments and decentralizing reforms, yielding vastly different trajectories. Generally utilizing a
minimalist perspective of assessment, the conclusions of the state of
democracy in Indonesia have been seen as that of a “procedural” or
a “hybrid” one.205 On the other hand, a maximalist perspective involves a greater scope that encompasses liberal-socialist parameters, which is concerned more with enhancing the quality of
democracy. Actors and other agents of the democracy apart from
institutions feature greatly when utilizing such a perspective. By far,
there had only been a single attempt at effectively quantifying the
dynamics of democratization in Indonesia.206 While it serves a very
important function in structurally assessing empirically whether democracy has been substantive enough, the process is often laborious.207 This paper, however, seeks to hypothesize a less laborious
but no less rigorous attempt at defining the state of democracy in
Indonesia by looking at reform developments at the various phases
and its implications. What was gathered was that democratic developments in Indonesia had entered a different phase almost inadvertently. Rival competition among various actors had increasingly led
to a “de-centering” of democracy in Indonesia. Electoral mecha204. For cases supporting democratic advancements brought about from the bottom
see Edward Aspinall, “Popular Agency and Interests in Indonesia’s Democratic Transition and Consolidation,” Indonesia 96 (October 2013): 101-21. See also Marcus
Mietzner, “Indonesia’s 2014 Elections: How Jokowi Won and Democracy Survived” in
Journal of Democracy, Volume 25, Number 4, October 2014, pp. 111-25.
205. A minimal definition of democracy involves a shallow reading of the extent of
democracy primarily exclusive to institutions. See Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism,
Socialism, Democracy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1943). “Hybrid” regimes usually refer
to polities that combine democratic and authoritarian features, thus seeing these regimes as neither democratic nor authoritarian. See Larry Diamond, “Elections Without
Democracy. Thinking about Hybrid Regimes” in Journal of Democracy, 13 (2): 21-35.
206. See Olle Tornquist, Assessing Dynamics of Democratization: Transformative
Politics, New Institutions, and The Case of Indonesia (Palgrave Macmillan, New York
2013).
207. Tornquist defines a substantive democracy as the process in achieving “the conditions and the efficiency of the institutions, as well as people’s capacity to use them,
that respected scholars deem to be intrinsic in building popular control on the basis of
political equality of the issues that people (who are affected by the government or lack
of government of these issues) deem to be public affairs”.
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nisms that had been crucial in facilitating such a shift in democratic
focus was reviewed earlier including the switch to a fully “open-list”
system, direct presidential elections and the emergence of direct local elections. Citizen-state interactions and civil society participation have boosted very much in scope and intensity not only with
the advent of decentralization efforts, but also with the ballot box
being brought directly to the people. On the other hand, newer
forms of social media that facilitate such an interaction and oversight of political figures have made its way into great acceptance by
Indonesians at large in various levels of society. As a result, oldstyle patrimonial politics is no longer the only path to local and
increasingly state-wide power with local elites and rising new leaders devising more innovative strategies other than money politics
and violence in the bid to gain the popular vote. Vertical accountability has gradually become the order of the day in big and small
elections.
A recent study on good governance at the local level in Indonesia proves such a point. In the district of Kebuman, Central Java,
researchers Ina Choi and Yuki Fukuoka have noted that the rise of
local elites (in this case it was the Bupati of Kebumen, Rustriningsih) who have committed themselves to better governance through
greater intervention by international donors combined with the
process of decentralization.208 As a result, instead of reverting to
the old patronage norms and modalities, Indonesian local elites can
now raise their profiles as “reformists” by drawing benefits from
greater intervention by the donor community. This follows closely
the new path that has now been blazed by current president of Indonesia, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and attempts by the older established elites to resist it. Jokowi first started out in the initial
experimentation with direct elections at the local level in 2005 as
mayor of Solo. His well-noted performance as a reformer was first
acknowledged by international observers and then gained widespread interest domestically with greater coverage of Jokowi and
the city of Solo. His win in Jakarta was a watershed moment as it
sealed his fate as a commoner and populist, a beneficiary of the
pilkada system that had managed to defeat the longstanding incumbents in Jakarta. His participation as presidential candidate of the
PDI-P was even more astounding as competition at the national
level was seen to be the preserve of party elites. His inauguration as
208. See Ina Choi and Yuki Fukuoka, “Co-opting Good Governance Reform: The
Rise of a Not-so-Reformist Leader in Kebumen, Central Java” in Asian Journal of Political Science (2014), pp. 1-19.

INDONESIA

BEYOND

REFORMASI

77

Indonesia’s sixth president post-reformasi is a testament to the new
blazing path to power – one that although not perfect, looked to be
unfettered distinctly by the usual constraints of old patronage politics, and rather by popularity and popular representation.
This “de-centered” approach to democracy in Indonesia is relatively new, although decentralization measures had taken place
since 1998. However, its effect can be felt. As the polity of postreformasi Indonesia shifted invariably over the years, this new development can be seen as a boon to observers. However, its presence may again be threatened. Recent efforts at abolishing the
direct pilkada system and converting it back to an indirect approach
is perhaps one of the few mechanisms the old established elites
have since utilized to reverse the “de-centering” steps democratization in Indonesia had taken. On the other hand, Jokowi now widely
seen as a reformist president received widespread acknowledgement of his representativeness and is keen to change the political
landscape of Indonesia despite the pressure from the opposition
and the lack of support within his own party. Nonetheless, one
thing can be sure – the “de-centering” of democracy in Indonesia is
here to stay.
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GLOSSARY

ABRI / TNI

: Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (The Republic of
Indonesia Armed Forces), after Reformasi, it changed to
Tentara National Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed
Forces)
Aliran
: “Streams”, constellation of traditional groups
Blusukan
: Impromptu Visits
Bupati
: Regent
DPP
: Central Committee Council (Dewan Pengurus Pusat)
DPR
: People’s Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat)
DPRD
: Regional People’s Representatives Council (Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah)
Dwifungsi
: Dual Functions refers to the Indonesian military’s defence
and security as well as socio-political role
GAM
: Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka)
Gerindra Party
: Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan
Indonesia Raya)
Golkar
: Functional Groups (Golongan Karya)
Hankam
: Defence and security (Pertahanan dan Keamanan)
Hanura Party
: People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat)
ICMI
: Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia)
Jokowi:
: Joko Widodo, 7th Indonesian President
Kabupaten
: Regency
KIH
: Great Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Hebat)
KKN
: Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism (Korupsi, Kolusi,
Nepotisme)
KMP
: Red White Coalition (Koalisi Merah Putih)
KORPRI
: Indonesian Civil Servant Corps (Korps Pegawai Negeri
Republik Indonesia)
Malari
: 15 January havoc (Malapetaka 15 Januari)
Kopassus
: Special Forces Command (Komando Pasukan Khusus)
Kostrad
: Army Strategic Command (Komando Cadangan Strategis)
KPU:
: General Elections Committee (Komisi Pemilihan Umum)
Masyumi Party
: Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations Party (Partai
Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia)
MD3
: MPR, DPR, DPRD and DPD (People’s Consultative
Assembly, People’s Representative Council, Regional
People’s Representatives Council. And Region’s
Representatives Council)
MEF
: Minimum Essential Force
MPR
: People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat)
New Order Regime : A regime during Soeharto’s presidency (Rezim Orde
Baru, 1966 – 1998)
New Paradigm
: New Paradigm (Paradigma Baru) refers to the concept
introduced by the Indonesian military to cope with
Reformasi environment

INDONESIA
NKRI
NU
Pancasila
PAN
PD
PDI-P
Pilkada
PKB
PKI
PKS
PNI
POLRI
PPP
Pribumi
Prolegnas
Putra Daerah
Reformasi
Sospol
SBY
UU
UUD 1945
Wansospolsus
Wansospolda
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: Republic of Indonesia Unitary State (Negara Kesatuan
Republik Indonesia)
: Nahdlatul Ulama, a traditionalist Sunni Islam group in
Indonesia, was established on 1926 as a reaction to the
modernist Muhammadiyah organization
: Five principles (Indonesia’s state foundation)
: National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional
: Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat)
: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)
: Regional Leaders Elections (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah)
: National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)
: Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia)
: Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)
: Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia)
: Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik
Indonesia)
: United Development Party (Partai Persatuan
Pembangunan)
: Native or indigenous people
: National Legislation Project (Proyek Legislasi Nasional)
: Local sons or people in a particular region
: Reformation, An era after the fall of Soeharto
: Social and Political (Sosial dan Politik)
: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 6th Indonesian President
: Laws (Undang-Undang)
: 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945)
: Central Council of Socio-Political Affairs (Dewan Sosial
Politik Pusat)
: Regional Council of Socio-Political Affairs (Dewan Sosial
Politik Daerah)
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Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China (Revised version of No. 7-1981
(44)) (Parris H. Chang), 48 pp.
$3.00
No. 3 - 1983 (56)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-55-3

Media-Coverage on Taiwan in The People’s Republic of China (Jörg-M.
Rudolph), 77 pp.
$4.00
No. 4 - 1983 (57)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-56-1

Transit Problems of Three Asian Land-locked Countries: Afghanistan,
Nepal and Laos (Martin Ira Glassner), 55 pp.
$3.00
No. 5 - 1983 (58)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-57-X

China’s War Against Vietnam: A Military Analysis (King C. Chen),
33 pp.
$3.00
No. 6 - 1983 (59)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-58-8

The People’s Republic of China, International Law and Arms Control
(David Salem), 325 pp. Index
$7.00
(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and
Politics Series, No. 3, ISBN 0-942182-59-6)
$15.00

1984 Series
No. 1 - 1984 (60)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-60-X

China’s Nuclear Policy: An Overall View (Shao-chuan LENG), 18 pp.
$3.00
No. 2 - 1984 (61)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-61-8

The Communist Party of China: Party Powers and Group Politics from
the Third Plenum to the Twelfth Party Congress (Hung-mao
TIEN), 30 pp.
$3.00
No. 3 - 1984 (62)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-62-6

Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China
Sea (Ying-jeou MA), 308 pp. Index (out of print)
$10.00
(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and
Politics Series, No. 4, ISBN 0-942182-63-4)
$15.00
No. 4 - 1984 (63)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-64-2

A New Direction in Japanese Defense Policy: Views from the Liberal
Democratic Party Diet Members (Steven Kent Vogel), 63 pp.
$3.00
No. 5 - 1984 (64)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-65-0

Taiwan’s Elections: Political Development and Democratization in the
Republic of China (John F. Copper with George P. Chen), 180 pp.
Index
$5.00
(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-942182-66-9)
$10.00
No. 6 - 1984 (65)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-67-7

Cankao Xiaoxi: Foreign News in the Propaganda System of the People’s Republic of China (Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph), 174 pp. Index
$5.00

1985 Series
No. 1 - 1985 (66)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-68-5

The Political Basis of the Economic and Social Development in the Republic of China (Alan P. L. Liu), 22 pp.
$3.00
No. 2 - 1985 (67)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-69-3

The Legal System and Criminal Responsibility of Intellectuals in the
People’s Republic of China, 1949-1982 (Carlos Wing-hung Lo), 125
pp. Index
$5.00
No. 3 - 1985 (68)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-70-7

Symposium on Hong Kong: 1997 (Edited by Hungdah CHIU), 100 pp.
Index
$4.00

No. 4 - 1985 (69)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-71-5

The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law (Hungdah CHIU),
18 pp. (out of print)
$3.00
No. 5 - 1985 (70)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-72-3

Peking’s Negotiating Style: A Case study of U.S.-PRC Normalization
(Jaw-Ling Joanne CHANG), 22 pp.
$3.00
No. 6 - 1985 (71)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-73-1

China’s Marine Environmental Protection Law: The Dragon Creeping
in Murky Waters (Mitchell A. Silk), 32 pp.
$3.00

1986 Series
No. 1 - 1986 (72)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-74-X

From Tradition to Modernity: A Socio-Historical Interpretation on
China’s Struggle toward Modernization Since the Mid-19th Century (Wen-hui TSAI), 76 pp.
$4.00
No. 2 - 1986 (73)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-75-8

Peace and Unification in Korea and International Law (Byung-Hwa
LYOU), 205 pp. Index.
$8.00
No. 3 - 1986 (74)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-76-6

The Hong Kong Agreement and American Foreign Policy (Hungdah
CHIU), 18 pp.
$3.00
No. 4 - 1986 (75)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-77-4

United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy
Decision Making (Jaw-ling Joanne CHANG), copublished with
Monograph Series in World Affairs, University of Denver, 246 pp.
Index. (out of print)
$8.00
(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and Politics
Series, No. 7. ISBN 0-942182-78-2)
$12.00
No. 5 - 1986 (76)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-79-0

Communications and China’s National Integration: An Analysis of
People’s Daily and Central Daily on the China Reunification Issue
(Shuhua CHANG), 205 pp.
$8.00
No. 6 - 1986 (77)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-80-4

Since Aquino: The Philippine Tangle and the United States (Justus M.
van der Kroef), 73 pp.
$3.00

1987 Series
No. 1 - 1987 (78)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-81-2

An Analysis of the U.S.-China Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement
(Benjamin Chin), 40 pp.
$3.00
No. 2 - 1987 (79)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-82-0

Survey of Recent Developments in China (Mainland and Taiwan), 19851986 (edited by Hungdah CHIU, with the assistance of Jaw-ling Joanne CHANG), 222 pp. Index
$8.00
No. 3 - 1987 (80)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-83-9

Democratizing Transition in Taiwan (Yangsun CHOU and Andrew J.
Nathan), 24 pp.
$3.00
No. 4 - 1987 (81)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-84-7

The Legal Status of the Chinese Communist Party (Robert Heuser),
25 pp.
No. 5 - 1987 (82)

ISSN 0730-0107

$3.00

ISBN 0-942182-85-5

The Joint Venture and Related Contract Laws of Mainland China and
Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis (Clyde D. Stoltenberg and David
W. McClure), 54 pp.
$4.00
No. 6 - 1987 (83)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-86-3

Reform in Reverse: Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China,
1986/1987 (Ta-Ling LEE and John F. Copper), 150 pp.
$8.00

1988 Series
No. 1 - 1988 (84)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-87-1

Chinese Attitudes toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 19781987 (Hungdah CHIU), 41 pp.
$3.00
No. 2 - 1988 (85)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-88-X

Chinese Views on the Sources of International Law (Hungdah CHIU),
20 pp.
$3.00
No. 3 - 1988 (86)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-89-8

People’s Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception (Roberta
Cohen), 103 pp. (out of print)
$5.00
No. 4 - 1988 (87)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-90-1

Settlement of the Macau Issue: Distinctive Features of Beijing’s Negotiating Behavior (with text of 1887 Protocol and 1987 Declaration)
(Jaw-ling Joanne CHANG), 37 pp.
$3.00

No. 5 - 1988 (88)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-91-X

The Draft Basic Law of Hong Kong: Analysis and Documents (edited
by Hungdah CHIU), 153 pp.
$5.00
No. 6 - 1988 (89)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-92-8

Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence
(edited by Lawrence W. Beer), 210 pp.
$10.00

1989 Series
No. 1 - 1989 (90)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-00-1

The Right to a Criminal Appeal in the People’s Republic of China
(Margaret Y.K. Woo), 43 pp.
$3.00
No. 2 - 1989 (91)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-01-X

The Status of Customary International Law, Treaties, Agreements and
Semi-Official or Unofficial Agreements in Chinese Law (Hungdah
CHIU), 22 pp.
$3.00
No. 3 - 1989 (92)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-02-8

One Step Forward, One Step Back, Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China in 1987/88 (John F. Cooper and Ta-ling LEE), 140
pp.
$6.00
No. 4 - 1989 (93)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-03-6

Tibet: Past and Present (Hungdah CHIU and June Teufel Dreyer), 25
pp.
$3.00
No. 5 - 1989 (94)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-04-4

Chinese Attitude toward International Law of Human Rights in the
Post-Mao Era (Hungdah CHIU), 38 pp.
$4.00
No. 6 - 1989 (95)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-05-2

Tibet to Tiananmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign
Policy (W. Gary Vause), 47 pp.
$4.00

1990 Series
No. 1 - 1990 (96)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-06-0

The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Hungdah
CHIU), 20 pp. (Please order No. 5-1992 (112) for a revised version
of this issue)
$3.00

No. 2 - 1990 (97)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-07-9

Tiananmen: China’s Struggle for Democracy—Its Prelude, Development, Aftermath, and Impact (Winston L. Y. Yang and Marsha L.
Wagner), 314 pp. Index (paperback out of print)
$8.00
(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and
Politics Series, No. 11, ISBN 0-925153-08-7)
$14.00
No. 3 - 1990 (98)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-09-5

Nationality and International Law in Chinese Perspective (Hungdah
CHIU), 37 pp.
$4.00
No. 4 - 1990 (99)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-10-9

The Taiwan Relations Act after Ten Years (Lori Fisler Damrosch),
27 pp.
$3.00
No. 5 - 1990 (100)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-11-7

The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations (Hungdah
CHIU), 34 pp. (out of print)
$4.00
No. 6 - 1990 (101)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-12-5

Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (John F.
Copper), 174 pp. Index (out of print)
$8.00

1991 Series
No. 1 - 1991 (102)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-13-3

Legal Aspects of Investment and Trade with the Republic of China (Edited by John T. McDermott, with contributions by Linda F. Powers,
Ronald A. Case, Chung-Teh LEE, Jeffrey H. Chen, Cheryl M.
Friedman, Hungdah CHIU, K.C. Fan and Douglas T. Hung), 94 pp.
$6.00
No. 2 - 1991 (103)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-14-1

Failure of Democracy Movement: Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China, 1988/89 (Ta-ling LEE and John F. Copper), 150 pp.
Index
$10.00
No. 3 - 1991 (104)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-15-X

Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution in Japan’s Legal
Culture (Lawrence W. Beer), 31 pp.
$5.00
No. 4 - 1991 (105)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-16-8

The 1989 US-Republic of China (Taiwan) Fisheries Negotiations (Mark
Mon-Chang Hsieh), 84 pp.
$6.00
No. 5 - 1991 (106)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-17-6

Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam —
Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development (Edited by Quansheng ZHAO and Robert Sutter), 198 pp. Index
$12.00

No. 6 - 1991 (107)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-18-4

Lawyers in China: The Past Decade and Beyond (Timothy A. Gelatt),
49 pp.
$5.00

1992 Series
No. 1 - 1992 (108)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-19-2

Judicial Review of Administration in the People’s Republic of China
(Jyh-pin FA & Shao-chuan LENG), 37 pp.
$5.00
No. 2 - 1992 (109)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-20-6

China’s Ministry of State Security: Coming of Age in the International
Arena (Nicholas Eftimiades), 24 pp.
$4.00
No. 3 - 1992 (110)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-21-4

Libel Law and the Press in South Korea: An Update (KYU Ho Youm),
23 pp.
$5.00
No. 4 - 1992 (111)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-22-2

Tiananmen Aftermath: Human Rights in the People’s Republic of
China, 1990 (John F. Copper and Ta-ling LEE), 133 pp. Index $15.00
No. 5 - 1992 (112)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-23-0

The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Revised version of No. 1-1990 (96)) (Hungdah CHIU), 37 pp.
$4.00
No. 6 - 1992 (113)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-24-9

China’s Criminal Justice System and the Trial of Pro-Democracy Dissidents (Hungdah CHIU), 21 pp.
$3.00

1993 Series
No. 1 - 1993 (114)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-25-7

Can One Unscramble an Omelet? China’s Economic Reform in Theory
and Practice (Yuan-li WU and Richard Y. C. Yin), 34 pp.
$4.00
No. 2 - 1993 (115)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-26-5

Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on
Taiwan (With Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 61 pp.
$6.00
No. 3 - 1993 (116)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-27-3

Sheltering for Examination (Shourong Shencha) in the Legal System of
the People’s Republic of China (Tao-tai HSIA and Wendy I.
Zeldin), 32 pp.
$4.00

No. 4 - 1993 (117)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-28-1

In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization between
Mainland China and Taiwan (Wen-hui TSAI), 281 pp. Index (out
of print, please order No. 5 - 1996 for 2nd ed.)
$18.00
No. 5 - 1993 (118)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-30-3

Hong Kong’s Transition to 1997: Background, Problems and Prospects
(with Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 106 pp.
$7.00
No. 6 - 1993 (119)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-31-1

Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (with Documents) (Hungdah
CHIU), 69 pp.
$5.00

1994 Series
No. 1 - 1994 (120)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-32-X

Statutory Encouragement of Investment and Economic Development in
the Republic of China on Taiwan (Neil L. Meyers), 72 pp.
$7.00
No. 2 - 1994 (121)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-33-8

Don’t Force Us to Lie: The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Reform Era (Allison Liu Jernow), 99 pp.
$7.00
No. 3 - 1994 (122)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-34-6

Institutionalizing a New Legal System in Deng’s China (Hungdah
CHIU), 44 pp.
$5.00
No. 4 - 1994 (123)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-35-4

The Bamboo Gulag: Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China,
1991-1992 (Ta-ling LEE & John F. Copper), 281 pp. Index
$20.00
No. 5 - 1994 (124)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-36-2

Taiwan’s Legal System and Legal Profession (Hungdah CHIU and
Jyh-pin FA), 22 pp.
$3.00
No. 6 - 1994 (125)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-37-0

Toward Greater Democracy: An Analysis of the Republic of China on
Taiwan’s Major Elections in the 1990s (Wen-hui TSAI), 40 pp.
$6.00

1995 Series
No. 1 - 1995 (126)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-38-9

Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of Chile
(Herman Gutierrez B. and Lin CHOU), 31 pp.
$5.00

No. 2 - 1995 (127)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-39-7

The Tibet Question and the Hong Kong Experience (Barry Sautman
and Shiu-hing LO), 82 pp.
$10.00
No. 3 - 1995 (128)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-40-0

Mass Rape, Enforced Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial
Army: Japan Eschews International Legal Responsibility?
(David Boling), 56 pp.
$5.00
No. 4 - 1995 (129)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-41-9

The Role of the Republic of China in the World Economy (Chu-yuan
CHENG), 25 pp.
$3.00
No. 5 - 1995 (130)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-42-7

China’s Economy after Deng: A Long-Term Perspective (Peter C.Y.
Chow), 43 pp.
$5.00
No. 6 - 1995 (131)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-43-5

An Entreprenurial Analysis of Opposition Movements (Ching-chane
HWANG), 179 pp. Index
$18.00

1996 Series
No. 1 - 1996 (132)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-44-3

Taiwan’s 1995 Legislatiave Yuan Election (John F. Copper), 39 pp.
No. 2 - 1996 (133)

ISSN 0730-0107

$6.00

ISBN 0-925153-45-1

Russian-Taiwanese Relations: Current State, Problems, and Prospects
of Development (Peter M. Ivanov), 76 pp.
$10.00
No. 3 - 1996 (134)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-46-X

Recent Relations between China and Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities (Hungdah CHIU & June Teufel Dreyer), 28 pp.
$4.00
No. 4 - 1996 (135)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-47-8

Intellectual Property Protection in the Asian-Pacific Region: A Comparative Study (Paul C. B. Liu & Andy Y. Sun), 183 pp. Index. $25.00
(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-48-6)
$32.00
No. 5 - 1996 (136)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-49-4

In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization between
Mainland China and Taiwan (2nd ed.) (Wen-hui TSAI), 297 pp.
Index.
$30.00
(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-50-8)
$37.00

No. 6 - 1996 (137)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-51-6

A Study of the Consular Convention between the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 68 pp.
$6.00

1997 Series
No. 1 - 1997 (138)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-52-4

Tiananmen to Tiananmen, China under Communism 1947-1996
(Yuan-Li WU), 348 pp. Index
$35.00
(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-53-2)
$45.00
No. 2 - 1997 (139)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-54-0

The External Relations and International Status of Hong Kong (TING
Wai), 72 pp.
$8.00
No. 3 - 1997 (140)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-55-9

Sheltering for Examination (Shoushen) in the People’s Republic of
China: Law, Policy, and Practices (Kam C. WONG), 53 pp.
$6.00
No. 4 - 1997 (141)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-56-7

Legal Aid Practices in the PRC in the 1990s — Dynamics, Contents and
Implications, (LUO Qizhi) 68 pp.
$8.00
No. 5 - 1997 (142)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-57-5

The KMT’s 15th Party Congress: The Ruling Party at a Crossroads
(John F. Copper), 38 pp.
$5.00
No. 6 - 1997 (143)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-58-3

From Pirate King to Jungle King: Transformation of Taiwan’s Intellectual Property Protection (Andy Y. Sun), 138 pp.
$18.00

1998 Series
No. 1 - 1998 (144)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-59-1

From “Multi-System Nations” to “Linkage Communities”: A New
Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations
(Yung WEI), 20 pp.
$4.00
No. 2 - 1998 (145)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-60-5

The Impact of the World Trade Organization on the Lack of Transparency in the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 63 pp.
$7.00
No. 3 - 1998 (146)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-61-3

The Nationalist Ideology of the Chinese Military (Xiaoyu CHEN), 45
pp.
$6.00

No. 4 - 1998 (147)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-62-1

Convergence and the Future of Reunification between Mainland China
and Taiwan: A Developmental View (Wen-hui TSAI), 33 pp.
$5.00
No. 5 - 1998 (148)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-63-X

Chinese Patent Law and Patent Litigation in China (Xiang WANG),
61 pp.
$8.00
No. 6 - 1998 (149)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-64-8

The Development of Banking in Taiwan: The Historical Impact on Future Challenges (Lawrence L.C. Lee), 39 pp.
$6.00

1999 Series
No. 1 - 1999 (150)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-65-6

An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the T’iaoyutai Islets
(Senkaku Gunto) (Hungdah CHIU), 27 pp.
$6.00
No. 2 - 1999 (151)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-66-4

Taiwan’s 1998 Legislative Yuan, Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections: Confirming and Consolidating Democracy in the Republic of China (John F. Copper), 53 pp.
$7.00
No. 3 - 1999 (152)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-67-2

The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of
the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan
(Han-yi SHAW), 148 pp. (out of print)
$20.00
No. 4 - 1999 (153)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-68-0

Election and Democracy in Hong Kong: The 1998 Legislative Council
Election (Shiu-hing LO & Wing-yat YU), 68 pp.
$9.00
No. 5 - 1999 (154)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-69-9

The ROC on the Threshold of the 21st Century: A Paradigm Reexamined (Edited by Chien-min CHAO & Cal Clark), 189 pp.
$24.00
No. 6 - 1999 (155)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-70-2

Party Primaries in Taiwan: Trends, Conditions, and Projections in Candidate Selection (Julian Baum and James A. Robinson), 39 pp.
$6.00

2000 Series
No. 1 - 2000 (156)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-71-0

United States-Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act (Edited by Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang & William W. Boyer),
309 pp. Index.
$28.00
(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-72-9)
$42.00

No. 2 - 2000 (157)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-73-7

Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics
(John F. Copper), 66 pp.
$9.00
No. 3 - 2000 (158)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-74-5

Legal Eligibility of Taiwan’s Accession to GATT/WTO (CHO HuiWan), 22 pp.
$6.00
No. 4 - 2000 (159)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-75-3

Russia’s Northeast Asia Policy: Challenges and Choices for the 21st
Century (Sharif M. Shuja), 22 pp.
$6.00
No. 5 - 2000 (160)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-76-1

East Asia and the Principle of Non-Intervention: Policies and Practices
(Linjun WU), 39 pp.
$7.00
No. 6 - 2000 (161)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-77-X

The Association of South East Asian Nations’ Confidence and Security
Building with the People’s Republic of China: Internal Constraints
and Policy Implications (Kwei-Bo HUANG), 61 pp.
$9.00

2001 Series
No. 1 - 2001 (162)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-78-8

Socio-economic Changes and Modernization in an Age of Uncertainty:
Taiwan in the 1990s and Its Future Challenge (Wen-hui TSAI),
35 pp.
$7.00
No. 2 - 2001 (163)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-79-6

Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act: An Examination after
Twenty Years (Edited by Hungdah CHIU, Hsing-wei LEE and
Chih-Yu T. WU), 267 pp.
$27.00
No. 3 - 2001 (164)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-80-X

The Diplomatic War between Beijing and Taipei in Chile (Lin CHOU),
61 pp.
$9.00
No. 4 - 2001 (165)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-81-8

Reforming the Protection of Intellectual Property: The Case
of China and Taiwan in Light of WTO Accession
(Andy Y. Sun), 46 pp.
$8.00
No. 5 - 2001 (166)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-82-6

Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in China (Vai Io LO), 26 pp.

$6.00

No. 6 - 2001 (167)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-925153-83-4
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